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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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**SDS Politician on Party Policy, Personalities**

92BA0411A Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 14 Jan 92  
p 21

[Interview with Georgi Markov, member of the Union of Democratic Forces, by Milena Dimitrova; place and date not given: "A Hungarian Woman in the Shadow Is Stirring the Stew of Bulgarian Reform"]

[Text] [Dimitrova] You would have been better suited to be minister than Svetoslav Luchnikov or Stoyan Ganev.

[Markov] I do not want you to compare me with Ganev. He is our strongest figure in the government and this will be understood in time. I would have been a better minister of justice than Luchnikov, for sure. He is an intelligent person, but lacks practical experience, while I have been in the kitchen of things. In general, I am the only person of the so-called leaders, who did not take any post. I even refused to become deputy chairman of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] parliamentary group. I think that there must be someone who at a given time can act as correction and who is not tied up with too many other things. Being appointed to any position in the hierarchy makes you get involved in the role and makes you a little unfaithful to yourself. I want to remain simply a parliament member and member of the Legislative Commission. This is no small job. I will continue my past style.

[Dimitrova] Do you think the present cabinet is somewhat weak?

[Markov] Sincerely speaking, some time is needed to understand whether it is weak or strong. We still haven't given it a chance, because practically all the legislation is old. Should it work on privatization, or attract investments, or return land—what should it do? It is another question, and you have sensed it correctly, that this cabinet still has not shown homogeneity. Individuals like Ganev and Ivan Kostov are noticed, but as a whole, the cabinet still has not manifested itself. Do not forget that it is an entirely new team without communists and it needs a few months to cleanse its apparatus from communist deputy ministers. Let us not even talk about the lower ranks in the administration.

[Dimitrova] Your radical views are hardly satisfied with the speed of banking reform and the changes in finances and the economy.

[Markov] In the parliament we formed a government in no time, passed the regulations manual, and a few laws. The issue is that from now on we have to carry out real legislation and we must do high-quality work. Every mistake can delay us years.

[Dimitrova] The ways of the majority, however, look somewhat impatient and uncompromising from the balcony.

[Markov] We do not want the Gin'o Ganev style. We do not want an imitation of activity. You do remember that

the two well-titled laws passed by the VNS [Grand National Assembly], the land law and the foreign investments law, turned out to be impossible to apply. We want high-quality and radical laws and we will not deviate from this line. Naturally, it is inconvenient for the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] because it understands that it is losing positions legislatively. Starting in January, our attention will be focused on the privatization law. It was not passed by the VNS, and it is the beginning of the end of the communist system. This is because 95 percent of the directors are people with limited, communist mentality. The basic trump cards we will play to revive Bulgaria are competition and enterprise. Of course, there is taxation and banking reform, as well as the establishment of an entirely new system of social [health care] and pension security.

[Dimitrova] You have not forgotten your election platform.

[Markov] This year it was more concise. In comparison, last year's looks like a dissertation. But if you ask me which country is an example for us, I would say Hungary. The Hungarian Democratic Forum governs in coalition with the Smallholders and the Christian Democratic Party. It serves as an example to us because SDS is carrying out radical right-wing reform, close to the philosophy of conservative and Christian democratic parties.

[Dimitrova] Does the occasional comparison with the bolshevik spirit in plenary sessions come because of the radicalness?

[Markov] We vote almost unanimously and simply do not have the right to do otherwise. I receive hundreds of letters. Ninety-nine percent of them are very cordially inclined toward us, while one percent is filled with threats and insults. I have come to the conclusion that we do our work well. The opponent does not like us, while our voters are satisfied. Otherwise I agree with your idea that we should seek parliamentary consensus regarding some problems. Support from BSP is very weak. There were only three votes from the BSP for my bill on voting for Bulgarians living abroad, while on the foreign investment issue in principle there were about ten supporters. At rallies, our sympathizers chant only "Lilov is, Lukanov is" and nothing else interests them. They would not forgive us any contacts at all with people from the past and this is why there are no contact groups in this parliament.

[Dimitrova] You attract the opponent under the common denominator of prominent socialists.

[Markov] I would be inclined to speak to some people from the Socialist Party: Shkolagerski, Poptodorova, Pirinski.

[Dimitrova] Not too long ago you fought with him.

[Markov] We were going to fight. Afterwards we talked and came to an understanding, and now it is as if nothing

had happened. I consider him the most intelligent one in the Socialist Party. In the Grand National Assembly we had the opportunity to talk more than once and we have not even permitted ourselves to make remarks to one another. The reason was that he swore at Stefan Savov and I saw him. He says he never swears, but this time he had lost his temper and was not himself. I wasn't myself, either. Anyway, we came to an understanding that the incident was closed and that we would both forget it.

[Dimitrova] It seems that you get into similar circumstances often. How do you control yourself?

[Markov] Oh, I do control myself. I have never lost my temper during any radio or television shows. In live contacts with socialists, however, I am very emotional, but I have never been unfaithful to myself. Our voters like my impulsiveness because the stakes are very high. We are talking about fighting people famous for their Balkan-Soviet self-confidence and one must talk more drastically so they can understand.

[Dimitrova] How do remarks such as "You'll see stars in front of your eyes" and "Ventsi, come hear what I'll tell them" correspond with your reputation as a lawyer?

[Markov] They do correspond. When I speak on professional topics, I do not get emotional, because I respect myself as a professional. I am one of the few young lawyers, I am 41 years old, and the only one of the plenary assembly who has written joint papers with the most prominent figures in law.

[Dimitrova] When did people start talking about your lacy baby blankets?

[Markov] Those were some statements I made at the Grand National Assembly and the communists, because they like to complicate things, got all involved. Since I was born it has been drummed into my head that I come from a bourgeois family. So that while they were eating from bowls made from dried gourds I was swaddled in lacy baby blankets. My mother was expelled from the university only because she came from a wealthy family. My grandmother, my grandfather, and my uncles come from the well-known Novkirishki family. But they were merchants and had nothing to do with politics. Regardless of this, one of my uncles did time in Belene, while my father was forced to work at construction sites. Naturally, they took a lot of property away from us, naturally we had to rent. In general communists always divided people into Sofia and the provinces, into large and small cities, into city dwellers and workers and I explain their complex in that there are people with different genes. I will immediately point to Stefan Savov as an example—he is third generation bourgeois parliamentarian and this is extremely obvious. His type and manner of thinking are different simply because his first seven years were different.

[Dimitrova] What does your family think of your political career?

[Markov] I couldn't work in politics if my wife didn't completely stand behind me. I am the son-in-law of Hungarians, my wife has a European upbringing and takes good care of me. I am always clean and neat, well fed, and I feel great. I have a hobby and it is attending rock concerts. I have seen live in Budapest Queen, David Bowie, Tina Turner. I also went to Levski games regularly and I am a close friend of Gundi's family. My 15-year-old daughter, Elizabet, is also an ardent SDS supporter; she has not missed a single rally and can make a much better political analysis than old man Milan Drenchev, for example.

[Dimitrova] Don't you sometimes make mistakes in parliamentary tactics?

[Markov] We still do not have good tactics. Our great procedural accomplishment is that we were able to minimize debates. Our strength is not in the debates, but in the voting, even though we have high-level professionals such as Ilko Eskenazi, Vasil Gotsev, Ventseslav Ivanov, Aleksander Dzherov, Asen Michkovski. So—they make three statements, we give three replies and the proof is in the voting. My personal motto before was elections to the end and now it is voting to the end. By now there is almost no procedural wandering. But perhaps we are better in accounting for the accents in parliamentary tactics.

[Dimitrova] Since you work in politics and not in law, has your opinion that it is a dirty business changed?

[Markov] You are absolutely right, it is very dirty. This has made me quit many times. The entire issue is that I came in as an expert. I used to go to rallies and vigils and yell: "Down with the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]!" Stoyan Ganev called me; I had a profession, made good money, conducted classes at the law school. Otherwise you are right. For half a century there has been no political life and traditions are dead.

[Dimitrova] The deputies with their immunity and prestige have acquired quite a few privileges. Not that I am jealous, but I do not think it is normal for them to pay four leva per night in one of the former oases of the Central Committee of the BCP, while the voters are paying 80 to 100 leva in the neighboring hotels.

[Markov] I am very sensitive on this topic. Ganev and I have gone all over the country with a Lada that was falling apart. Even its windows wouldn't open in the heat. We went to 127 towns. Without underestimating anyone I will enumerate the "magnificent five" who carried the election on their backs: Stoyan Ganev, Ventseslav Ivanov, Stefan Savov, Aleksander Yordanov and I. Not that we are smarter than the rest, but because we found the strength to go all over the country. We continue to travel now. It was after the elections that a wealthy [woman] compatriot of ours gave us a Ford, but it came quite late. I emphasize again that it is a gift, and even now I still feel uneasy about it.

[Dimitrova] Wait a minute, wasn't a resolution passed according to which gifts to deputies amounting to more than one-quarter of their salaries are to be handed over to the parliament?

[Markov] No, this is not a personal gift. Our compatriot gave one car each to the Radical Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, and the ODTs [United Democratic Center]. Otherwise I am absolutely against the "bluing" of the nomenclature. I could not go to a resort station that smells of moldy chiefs, not for four, not for 400 leva per night. I feel best when I take my wife to Budapest, and after we take a walk along Vatsi and drink some good wine, after we see some good movie or concert, we go to bed that night with a clear conscience.

### Position of BZNS-United on Ethnic Issue

92BA0431A Sofia ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME  
in Bulgarian 7 Jan 92

[Article in two installments by Metodi Nedyalkov: "BZNS-United and Ethnic Problems in the Republic of Bulgaria"]

[7 Jan pp 1-2]

[Excerpts] The ethnic problems in Bulgaria have a history of their own. They have revealed an uneven development in the course of time and have become dramatically aggravated in the last decade.

Unlike many other parties in the country, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS] has always had a clear, consistent, and humane concept and policy on this matter.

We believe that the aggravation of this problem (conventionally described as ethnic) is the result of several basic factors:

1. The extremely inconsistent behavior and sociopolitical theorizing of the communist totalitarian regime which governed the country for decades. As we know, the communist rulers went through a period of national nihilism (with the faulty doctrine of "proletarian internationalism") ending with the "renaissance process" which was in total violation of international treaties and acts governing today's human rights standards.
2. The existence of outside interests with their theoretical motivations, such as the doctrine of "external Turks," etc.
3. The profound economic upheavals in the countries of the now collapsed socialist system logically led to the aggravation of separatist trends, including civil wars.
4. The aspiration of political forces to make use of ethnic conflicts in their strictly party interests.

Having taken into consideration these basic factors, as a political organization as well as the traditional voice of the moral virtues of the nation and its political will, and

as an organization which has always put national above purely party interests, and as a systematic promoter of a social practice based on the democratic traditions of the Bulgarian renaissance and democracy, an organization independent of any external influence and pressure on the part of biased external fora and organizations, the BZNS-United must propose, defend, and implement its concept concerning interethnic relations. This concept is based on the following:

1. Tradition developed in the organizational, social, and brief governing practice of the Union.
2. International and constitutional legal standards.
3. The historical and geographic factors of the Bulgarian state.

Unquestionably, the highest percentage of Bulgarian citizens of non-Bulgarian ethnic origin belong to population groups in the country related to the Turkish ethnic group. We must take into consideration the fact that the affiliation with this segment by other groups on the basis of religious faith, such as Bulgarian Muslims or Gypsy Muslims is out of place. One of the features for affiliation with a minority ethnic group is sharing a common language, which today is usually referred to as the "mother tongue." We know that most Bulgarian Muslims speak Bulgarian as their native language, while the Muslim Gypsies speak the Gypsy language and, occasionally, a Romanian dialect. As to Bulgarian citizens who belong to the Turkish ethnos, and Bulgarian Muslims, in addition to religion they are traditionally united on the basis of another social feature: mass affiliation with the stratum of our society engaged in agriculture. Hence the traditional commonality of socially aware individuals who are members of these minority groups with agricultural ideology and BZNS organizational structures. [passage omitted]

The brief historical reference provided here [not included here] does not include many other purely agrarian acts such as, for instance, the publication of an agricultural newspaper in the Turkish language, the opening of municipal schools for the teaching of the Turkish language during the period of agrarian rule, etc. However, it indicates quite convincingly the demographic and humanistic attitude of the organization of Bulgarian agrarians toward the problems of minority ethnic groups in Bulgaria.

The position held by a contemporary political organization concerning social ethnic problems would be impossible were it to disagree with international treaties and acts adopted at international fora, which set to a significant extent the so-called "human rights standards." These standards substantiate the unquestionable acceptance by the participating countries of the need to improve internal legal systems to regard as equal in the eyes of the law all of their citizens, regardless of sex, race, color, political convictions, ethnic awareness, religion, or economic status. Today these standards are inflexible as related to civil rights for the free expression of religious

beliefs, ethnic awareness, and political convictions, as well as the right to have a person's name consistent with the ethnic and religious traditions of the minority community to which the individual belongs. They are equally firm concerning the right to communicate in one's native language, to disseminate and receive information in that same language, and the right to engage in specific cultural activities and to perform religious rituals.

Theories concerning human rights as an essential feature of the democratic system of a society are based on the concept of the fundamental significance of subjective rights and the fact that the specific individual has the proper means to protect them (judicial redress, complaints, etc.). These views have been reflected in the mechanisms and structures of the legal systems of developed democratic states. Consequently, the purpose of the legislation and practices of a democratic government should be to efficiently guarantee the rights of all Bulgarian citizens, including the specific rights in the areas of language, culture, education, and religion of those who belong to ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups.

On the international level, this approach constitutes the rejection of the Versailles system. That approach was characterized by the presence of a certain internal legal status of minorities, and the possibility of their legal protection provided by external forces. This was one of the factors which aggravated international and intergovernmental relations and which, in the final account, led to the outbreak of World War II.

#### [8 Jan p 2]

[Text] The drafters of the UN Charter repeatedly expressed the view that the emphasis on guaranteeing the human rights of all individuals makes unnecessary any special stipulations, the purpose of which are to protect the rights of individuals classified on the basis of a community-identifying feature. Therefore, the new approach is based not on granting special status to some communities in order to guarantee the rights of the freedoms of individuals affiliated with them, but the obligation of the states not to allow any discrimination, on the basis of any feature whatsoever, against specific individuals, regardless of their affiliation or nonaffiliation with groups identified on the basis of certain features, within the respective state. This approach prevailed at second reading by the Human Rights Commission's working group of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Individuals Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic Minorities.

Nonetheless, efforts have been made to revise this approach. The concept of collective rights within the framework of the United Nations is actively supported by Yugoslavia (?), Hungary, Ukraine, and Sweden, which believe that guarantees for the respect of the rights of individuals belonging to minorities could be granted only as collective rights of minorities. This ignores the fact that they are based on the concept of the rights of "individuals belonging to... minorities," stipulated

within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as the plans of the Council of Europe. In practical terms, they result in granting collective rights to some minority categories.

This view is opposed by a number of countries, such as France, the United States, Greece, Germany, and others. The United States, for instance, believes that "the resolution of the problems should be sought not through unclear formulations concerning collective rights but through the full observance by the governments of fundamental civil and political rights and freedoms." This implies that on an international scale the problems related to the legal regulation of collective rights are arguable and that each country should proceed on the basis of its own specific circumstances and interests.

Furthermore, it must be made clear that in international treaties which have been the international legal basis for contacts among countries in the period after World War II there has been no universally accepted definition of the terms "minority" or "national or ethnic minority." The term "national minority" became the source of particular controversy, for it presumes affiliation of a given minority group with another nation, with all the consequences deriving from this fact. The aspiration of specifically interested states to have a legal definition of the concept "minority" and of the concept "national" and "ethnic" in the context of international regulation of collective rights, including the granting of cultural autonomy, self-government, and a share in the administration of the country and, subsequently, territorial autonomy, which is one of the prerequisites for peacefully changing borders, clashes with the basic principles of the Helsinki stipulation of the inviolability and unchangeability of territorial borders.

It is clear that such trends in the documents adopted at international fora and, particularly, by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe generally benefit nationalistic and religious fundamentalist movements and doctrines. Such movements and doctrines exist in the Balkan countries and constitute a real threat of the revival of the Versailles system. This conflicts with general European and Bulgarian national interests.

The geographic location of our state, as well as its historical fate are prerequisites for the fact that the Bulgarian nation is the result of the integration among a variety of ethnic groups. This fact is the foundation for its beautiful variety and physical and spiritual stability. The existence of many dialects in the Bulgarian language, each one in and of itself beautiful and expressive, of the languages of other ethnic groups, and of cultural and ethnic variety does not violate its integrity. That is why Bulgaria is a one-nation state. The Bulgarian national revival took place in the struggle against several centuries of national slavery, thus proving the insurmountable vitality of the nation.

Taking all of this into consideration (although not presented in all of its details), the Bulgarian Agrarian

People's Union defines its position on the ethnic problems of the nation as follows:

1. The definition of belonging to one ethnic group or another is a matter of individual self-awareness.
2. Inadmissibility of any discrimination based on ethnic, religious, or linguistic features.
3. Total equality in the eyes of the law.
4. Legal protection of the individual rights of individuals belonging to minority ethnic groups, in accordance with internationally adopted human rights standards.
5. Preferential protection of ethnic cultures threatened by the practices of communist totalitarian rule.
6. Study of the "mother tongue," including in municipal and state schools.
7. Legal guarantee of the right to religious belief.
8. The existence and activities of political organizations based on ethnic and religious foundations conflicts with the Constitution and harms the natural processes of cohabitation and social peace.
9. Any coerced assimilation to be treated as genocide.
10. Rejection of any external interference in the resolution of Bulgarian ethnic contradictions.
11. Insisting at international fora on a reciprocal attitude toward Bulgarian ethnic groups settled in other countries.

The resolution of the problems should begin with the adoption of two basic laws in the parliament:

1. A law against discrimination based on ethnic or religious affiliation, and for the consolidation of the nation.
2. A law on religious beliefs.

The central and local executive authorities must be guided by said principles.

We should seek to unify the view of the different political organizations and parties with a view to developing in the future a lasting strategic line to be followed by the Bulgarian parliament and the executive authorities.

[ZEMEDELJSKO ZNAME] Remark: This article has also drawn on documents provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

#### **BSP Leader Lilov's Report to Party Congress**

92BA0316A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 16 Dec 91  
pp 3-5

["Text" of political report delivered at the 40th Bulgarian Socialist Party Congress by Aleksandur Lilov,

chairman of the Party Supreme Council: "The Bulgarian Socialist Party Must Become a New Party"]

[Text] Comrades:

We are marking the centennial of the day Dimitur Blagoev and his fellow workers founded the Bulgarian Workers Social Democratic Party at Buzludzha Peak, the successor to which is the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. From this viewpoint, the 40th Congress is an anniversary Congress. Remember the Buzludzha celebration of this anniversary on 4 August 1991: It was an explosion of love, daring, and faith in socialism shown by different generations of Bulgarian socialists. What happiness it was that we were together, that there were so many of us, that we had not changed but that we are following the road which started on Buzludzha. Let us now breathe in this congress hall the air of that unforgettable day, for today we need the power of reason and the courage of our convictions to meet the storms and be staunchly realistic in the analysis of the extremely difficult problems which are facing the party after the October parliamentary and local elections.

However, you must also remember the situation in the National Assembly, the day before yesterday, when the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] and DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] were voting on the Law on the Confiscation of BSP property. What sinister hatred there was, what thirst for revenge, what unconcealed desire to repress and, essentially, to ban the Bulgarian Socialist Party. The drafting of extraordinary legislation, which reminds us of the harshest periods in our political history, has begun in Bulgaria. The ghost of a new, dark-blue [right-wing] violence and a threat of a new, dark-blue oligarchy, showed up over Bulgaria.

I put it to you, dear comrades, that the 40th Congress, as it expresses the indignation of half a million socialists, answers all this as follows: You are wrong, gentlemen of the SDS and the DPS. You will not succeed in suppressing the Bulgarian Socialist Party and you will never see it on its knees. You are a threat not only to the BSP but, above all, to democracy in Bulgaria. You would like to display your punitive power, but instead you are demonstrating your political weakness. You are taking away the property of the BSP, aiming at its collapse. However, you must know that henceforth you will be facing an even stronger and, unlike your own, a truly democratic party, which is even more loyal to the working people and the ideas of socialism; a renovated party. With or without property, the Bulgarian Socialist Party will work for democracy in Bulgaria and for leading the country out of the crisis.

Unquestionably, we are experiencing some of the most acute phenomena and processes of the profound changes taking place in our country. The 40th Congress must provide a true assessment of the existing situation and set for the party the right direction under those circumstances.

The crisis in our society is continuing. The processes are numerous and are taking place with an inordinately high dynamism. It would be difficult to review the situation in its entire variety. However, there are three questions of fundamental significance in our current work. They are the following:

1. The elections and BSP postelectoral tactics.
2. Reforms of the political system and the economy.
3. Changes in the party.

From this viewpoint, the 40th Congress is and should be a pragmatic congress which would provide a clear answer and shape our position and policies concerning the most relevant matters.

Let us not forget that we have behind us a 100-year-old complex history. However, let us also be aware that we are responsible for the present, which is described as one of reform and which needs reformers.

Consequently, the most important thing is for the 40th Congress to be a reform congress, and I am certain that it will be precisely that, a reform congress.

**I. The BSP After the Elections: It Is Necessary To Create a New, Democratic Opposition of a European Type Based on European Standards. The Struggle for Democracy Is the Basis of Our Efforts**

**Political Assessment of Electoral Results**

Comrades:

The 13 October 1991 elections brought about major changes in the country's political life. The status of the BSP in the National Assembly and in society changed. We are facing a new distribution of political forces. The atmosphere and work procedures in the Bulgarian parliament are also new.

What are the basic facts which characterize this change?

First, the BSP lost its status of ruling party and became an opposition party. Although by little, we nonetheless yielded our leading position in the parliament.

Second, the SDS won the parliamentary elections. Still, this victory is minimal, by 1.22 percent, and four seats more than the BSP, which does not allow the SDS to govern alone.

Third, the role of the DPS increased in the National Assembly and, in some parts of the country, the movement assumed monopoly positions in local administrations. Gradually, the DPS is gaining a decisive influence in making laws and in the parliamentary decisions made by the ruling coalition.

Fourth, the BSP convincingly won the local elections, although it did not show itself adequately in the largest cities in the country.

How can we assess the electoral results achieved by our party?

In the period since the elections, a variety of sometimes even conflicting assessments were made within the party and in wider social circles, about the way the Socialist Party and its allies had presented themselves. According to some, the BSP has made its latest retreat and has even suffered a political defeat. According to other comrades, the electoral results were positive, for the party removed itself from executive power at a time which is difficult for any ruling party, and will thus be able to pay greater attention to its own renewal.

Both assessments contain a certain truth. However, neither one is able to provide a full and accurate evaluation of what occurred in the parliamentary and local elections.

Such an assessment requires nonstandard criteria, for the very development of processes in Bulgaria is just as nonstandard. The traditional outcome of electoral results (electoral victory or electoral defeat) can provide neither an accurate assessment nor a proper orientation pertaining to the party's further actions.

That is why we need a nontraditional approach in analyzing the electoral results. Its main feature is the following combination: A new political standard, realism, and a concrete approach, consistent with the exceptionally dynamic and conflicting aspects of Bulgarian political and economic life.

This approach demands, above all, for us to note that the BSP was unable to attain its electoral objective in both aspects: to have an absolute or a leading majority in parliament. The fact that the conditions at the time these objectives were formulated (the beginning of August 1991) made their implementation entirely impossible is a different matter.

At the same time, we must emphasize that the minimal distance from the victorious coalition and, particularly, the great scale of the support which the electoral alliance of the BSP obtained from the voters, provide a number of advantages to the party in the current political and socioeconomic situation in the country.

After the elections, the BSP holds firm positions in the National Assembly and in society. What supports this conclusion?

First, the party, together with its partners, has a strong parliamentary group, which, like it or not, the SDS must take into consideration. The fact that currently the SDS is not doing this is proof of its political weakness and democratic immaturity.

Second, we have going for us the majority of the mayors of municipalities and settlements, who were elected on the basis of the majoritarian principle, as well as a high percentage of municipal national councils.

Third, we enjoy a strong influence in society, for we remain the most numerous and best organized political party in the country.



Even more essential is the fact that the Bulgarian Socialist Party has emerged from the elections strengthened, for it was able to repel the blows which were dealt at it from all sides. It was able not only to defend itself but even to become the best active political party, despite the fact that both domestic and foreign observers predicted its electoral rout.

In the parliament, the BSP has guaranteed opportunities to block any attempt at changing the country's constitution, aimed at the democratic processes in Bulgaria and at the party itself.

The party has kept its strong positions, for with the new political configuration it has a real opportunity to establish itself as the most serious left-wing force in the parliament and in society. We must take into consideration the political space in the parliament, which has become freed from centrist forces, and assume the role which today no one can assume in the parliamentary center. Naturally, the next elections will provide an answer to the type of political configuration which will develop in the Bulgarian parliament.

At the same time, as a party we must clearly realize that a trend is developing in the National Assembly which does not offer scope for parliamentary democracy. The BSP must do everything possible to block this dangerous trend.

The activities of the National Assembly during the past month indicate some drastic recurrences of parliamentary diktat by the majority. The danger that parliamentary democracy will be greatly restricted and deformed is entirely real.

Finally, our positions are firm because the electoral results gave us the opportunity to establish in Bulgaria a new democratic, a European-style, position. By rejecting the experience of the SDS in the Grand National Assembly, not by words but through political actions, we must give Bulgarian democracy a new, a European, standard of political opposition.

To sum it up, we could draw the conclusion that from the viewpoint of our short-term future the electoral results have been favorable to the Bulgarian Socialist Party. They have given it the opportunity to remain the greatest political force in social change. They legitimized the BSP both within and outside the country as a political party of great influence.

On the broader strategic level, the electoral results could be rated as successful, asserting the BSP as a basic factor of the democratic process in our country. Why is this?

First, because unlike similar parties in the countries of East Europe, who were thrown out into the periphery of political life, the Bulgarian Socialist Party has a real positive future. We must change, we must adapt to the new conditions in order to be able to make use of this positive future and of the reputation which we are objectively acquiring among leftist forces in Europe.

Second, because the Bulgarian Socialist Party has become an opposition party in a prestigious way. This is important in terms of its stabilization politically and ideologically, and, particularly, in terms of cadres. The party will not have to drink the bitter cup of defeat and experience the political and psychological blows as a result, something virtually all other parties in East Europe experienced.

Third, because the Bulgarian Socialist Party is given the possibility of concentrating on the most important thing: acquiring the skill to express and defend the interests of the working people, to defend the positions of its electorate, and to contribute to the resolution of their specific social problems. So far we have been relying essentially on our political work, on the strength of the people's political convictions. Now we shall either become the spokesmen for and defenders of the interests of the broad social strata, or we shall have a bad future.

Fourth, the electoral results offer us very good opportunities to develop changes within the party itself. We are already facing the tasks not of a renovation but of a radical change of the party and of the transformation of the BSP into a new political formation. This requires a serious discussion and extensive efforts. There are no ready answers. Answers must be found by the party itself through analysis and persistent work and not through phraseology.

Difficulties and major trials await us. The extreme right is preparing blows, some of which will be drastic in terms of their antidemocratic nature. However, there is no room for either depression or for dramatizing the electoral results.

Today it is exceptionally important to surmount the "power syndrome" in some BSP circles. The new situation should be analyzed on the basis of new, modern, and democratic criteria, and not from the positions of a party which cannot reconcile itself to its loss of power. It is imperative to accelerate the development of a new democratic political standard among Bulgarian socialists.

We cannot always be the ruling party. The reaction shown by some comrades, who consider it a tragedy that the elections were won by another party, is unjustified. In a democratic society, victory in any given election is not an absolute indicator of a party's strength and prosperity; nor is loss an indicator of its weakness or decline. These are normal cycles in the democratic political process, which our party must realize and accept.

The party must realize its responsibility as an opposition party and use it in the strongest possible manner which would be most useful to Bulgaria.

At the same time, we must not underestimate in any way the serious consequences of the electoral loss. This is an important political fact. As party chairman, I state to the Congress that I assume political responsibility for these

results. I make this statement fully convinced of it and I ask the Congress to accept it as a normal democratic act and as my wish to withdraw from the party's leadership. The time has come to lay the beginning of a new tradition in our party: dignified changes in its leadership.

Naturally, today what matters most is to make an accurate analysis of the main reasons for the electoral results.

First the electoral results were influenced by external, international factors. Three among them stand out as particularly important. Above all, the right-wing trend of processes developing in East Europe. There is a clearly demarcated attack mounted against socialist ideas and their main bearers, the postcommunist parties. This hinders us greatly. At the same time, however, it also gives us the opportunity to draw lessons from the errors of others and to formulate the party's right strategy and tactics for its participation in the democratic process.

The attempted coup d'etat in the USSR, the banning of the CPSU, and the grave instability in the Soviet Union had a tremendous impact on the electoral campaign and its results. As we realized, this changed the attitude toward us of a significant segment of the moderate electorate as well as among people who were either uncertain or afraid.

Naturally, we must also take into consideration the substantial help (in terms of the scale of our country) which the West, the United States in particular, gave the SDS. Such financial, material, political, and expert assistance played the role of "political doping" of our opponents.

The second group of reasons are of a domestic nature.

The most important among them is the way our overall behavior after the 1990 elections affected the electorate, particularly the errors we made in our exercise of power. The impression developed among some people that we are either unable or unwilling to make use of the power granted to us by the electorate. An uncertainty appeared concerning the resolve of the BSP to govern the country in the ensuing difficult period. The responsibility for this falls on the party's leadership and the governments the party formed.

The concentrated manipulative campaign mounted against the BSP by television and radio played an exceptionally negative role. Despite the weaknesses which took place, our campaign in most electoral areas was efficient and it was precisely that which allowed us to compensate to a certain extent for the impact exerted by the mass media. However, we were unable to turn matters around to our benefit. The role played and the contribution made to our presentation in the elections by the newspaper DUMA were exceptionally valuable. Let us express our gratitude to it as well as our comradely support in the difficult struggle which this newspaper is courageously waging and with such talent. Whatever the gentlemen of the SDS & Co. may be saying, DUMA is

the best newspaper today in Bulgaria. We also are grateful to the newspapers PARDON, VECHERNI NOVINI, and ZEMYA, and the other central and local socialist publications.

However, the truth is that in the mass information media we found ourselves not only isolated but, occasionally, also passive. While pursuing an essentially correct political course and making sensible compromises, in a number of situations we left the impression that we were unable to react sufficiently rapidly and accurately to the political and propaganda attacks mounted against us. We must clearly realize that our ideological work is below the standard of today's realities and the needs of the BSP.

Next we must stress the split within the moderate and centrist forces within the country. The aspiration to develop several political centrist groups was a gross error which led to their real defeat and which made the political situation in the country quite difficult.

Finally, insufficient development of the processes of change within the party, the omissions in the course of the electoral campaign, and the condition of the party's leadership had a major impact. These matters will be analyzed later in this report.

A certain hardening by a segment within the party was allowed, the political reactions of which did not attract but repelled the hesitant voters. We also were slow in solving some problems, which had an adverse impact among the public. One of them was matter of the party's property: It is necessary for the Congress to provide a clear answer to the question of why the solution of this problem was delayed and who is personally to be blamed for this. The BSP went to the elections without any real support from the trade union organizations. The additions to the Law on Pensions, which was passed on the last day of the Grand National Assembly session, was a gross error. The endless conflicts within the leadership and their cyclical and spasmodic manifestations caused a painful reaction within the party.

The party must display realism in its analysis of the weaknesses which occurred, draw the necessary lessons, and do everything necessary to surmount them. The presidential elections offer such an opportunity.

#### **The Parliamentary Group of the Party Has an Enhanced Role in the Responsibility for the Implementation of the Party's Policy**

Our immediate objective is to make of the BSP a contemporary and efficient opposition force within and outside the National Assembly.

It must be a constructive opposition, which will not only criticize the actions of the majority but also propose its own alternative resolutions.

It must be a flexible opposition, which will make use of any available opportunity to cooperate, for the sake of

democracy and civil peace and in the interests of the nation and the Bulgarian state.

It must be a firm opposition in defending the vital socioeconomic interests of the working people.

Under the new circumstances, the presentation of the BSP as a democratic, constructive and decisive opposition will increasingly depend on its parliamentary group. The role of our parliamentary group has increased, which raises new requirements concerning the standards and efficiency of debates within the group, the organization of its activities, and its unity and ability to act.

The work which has been accomplished so far by the parliamentary group in the Grand National Assembly and in the present parliament deserves a positive rating. We must not belittle what was accomplished. The group made a great contribution to the implementation of the party's policy, the preservation of civil peace, and the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria. It would be the right and deserved thing for the Congress to express its gratitude to the socialist national representatives and to the BSP parliamentary group.

Nonetheless, we also allowed a number of weaknesses to occur, which must be corrected. The demands which the party and the voters made to the group were justified. We must improve and significantly perfect our parliamentary work.

The BSP parliamentary group must have an integral and precisely developed strategy for its work.

Above all, it is necessary to energize the legislative initiative by the socialists in the parliament. It is necessary not only to criticize draft bills submitted by the ruling coalition but also to formulate and submit in the parliament and to the public our own plans, particularly in the areas of economic reform, social protection, and ensuring national security and democracy in the country.

As the opposition, the BSP ascribes particular importance to parliamentary control over the activities of the government. Combined with a flexible and properly gauged behavioral tactics in parliamentary debates and in work in the commissions, and control over the exercise of executive power could display the real aspect of a truly new and democratic opposition. Particularly important are, in this direction, the tasks of the team of spokesmen for the parliamentary group. The must not only control the activities of the respective ministers but also submit competing solutions to real practical issues.

Maximum information to the party and to the public concerning the behavior of the BSP in the National Assembly and making known our suggestions and options is a particularly important element in our parliamentary activities. So far, this has been one of the weak aspects of our efforts. In the future, our successful activities as a constructive and firm opposition will be inconceivable without a change in our relations with the voters.

### **Opening the BSP to Society Is the Main Trend in the Party's Future Work**

In today's circumstances, our parliamentary activities cannot remain isolated from the overall political work done by the party among the broadest possible social strata. We shall be successful as a party only if we expand and enhance our ties with the voters. We need specific and efficient ways of informing the electorate and in consulting with some of its strata—workers, young people, intellectuals, petty owners, and entrepreneurs.

The situation which has developed in the parliament and in political life as a whole and the bipolarity of the established parliamentary configuration require a drastic strengthening of our contacts and ties with nonparliamentary parties, above all with moderate and centrist forces. The BSP must look for all possible cooperation with them concerning parliamentary problems and legislative initiative. Even greater opportunities for cooperation exist within the local authorities, where these forces are represented to a greater or lesser extent.

It is obvious that, remembering the electoral results, a key aspect of BSP political tactics will be making full use of the local authorities, particularly where the socialists have won. This calls for a proper preparation and coordination of the groups of socialists within the municipal councils, and the assistance of the parliamentary group and the local party bodies, and taking local problems and interests into consideration in overall parliamentary and political activities.

The opening of the Bulgarian Socialist Party to society is inconceivable without the formulation and adoption of a new trade union policy, or without constant and constructive ties with leftist trade union organizations. Such cooperation is needed above all for the sake of protecting the social and professional interests of hired labor. The current situation is unacceptable in the case of an opposition party, and the Congress must discuss and find the best way of resolving it. As an opposition party, the BSP must no longer remain without trade union support.

The loss of party influence among the workers is worrisome. We were unable to reorganize our work after the party organizations withdrew from the enterprises. Our party must have a clear policy which expresses the interests of the workers. Such a policy must be realized through specific actions in defense of their immediate interests: jobs, income, health care, housing, and working and living conditions.

The voice of the party must be heard more clearly in the forthcoming resolution of the structural problems of enterprises; limiting the consequences of unemployment; and opening new jobs. Without such specific efforts we would be unable to regain the trust of the workers and would draw in question a large part of the social foundations of our party.

The party will seek possibilities for cooperating with all left-wing and democratic social movements, ecological, women's, and youth groups, and religious communities, above all the Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Church.

Opening the party to the youth and the intelligentsia is of particular importance. In this area there exists a trend toward withdrawal and loss of our influence. This trend can and must be surmounted.

The opening of the party to the scientific and technical and artistic intelligentsia is possible only if it is able to offer a better cultural and scientific policy and if it truly defends the interests of said intelligentsia. Spiritual life in our country [words missing]. Our parliamentary group must become the initiator in passing laws in defense of culture and for the creation of better conditions for the development of education, science, literature, and the arts. The Bulgarian Socialist Party must ask for state and public support in the spiritual area, the protection of the intellectual potential of the nation, and freedom of speech, thought, and creativity.

The opening of the party to the intelligentsia also presumes the enhancement of its role in the further changes within the BSP. It is the generator of new ideas and trends in our transformation into a modern left-wing party.

We need a new youth policy. We can gain the trust of the youth only by offering it better alternatives in solving the problems which affect it. This includes possibilities for development and self-realization, access to education and housing, and the possibility of leading a civilized life. The young will come to us if we become the bearers of modern ideas and thoughts, if we accelerate our change, and if the young people become the nucleus of the changes we are making.

One of the most essential elements in BSP political activities under the new conditions is attaining successful results in the forthcoming presidential elections.

Given the existing ratio of political forces, the Bulgarian Socialist Party believes that it would be best not to nominate its own candidate for president. This decision is dictated not by weakness but by the realization that Bulgaria needs to have an independent president, who would rally the nation and would be guided exclusively by national interests.

That is why the BSP position is clear: It will support the type of presidential platform, presidential policy, and president who will guarantee the country's national security and sovereignty; the unification of the nation and the elimination of confrontation; the stabilization of the situation through the systematic pursuit of a strategy of peaceful conversion to a democratic society; true above-party behavior; and an international policy consistent with national interests.

The conclusion to everything mentioned so far is imperatively clear: The Bulgarian Socialist Party must be wide

open to society. This is not only one of the basic party tasks but also one of the main guarantees for its future.

## **II. The BSP and Reforms in Our Country: Need for a Left-Wing Alternative to the Political and Economic Reform**

Comrades:

Two years have passed since the start of the political reform. The conversion from a totalitarian to a democratic society began with radical political changes. It was the BSP which started this transition. This is a historical fact, whether the SDS acknowledges it or not.

Our objective is the democratization of society. Socialism means democracy, the progress of democracy in all areas and for every person. The BSP drew a radical lesson from the totalitarian past: That socialism without democracy neither exists nor is possible. No one and nothing would let us ignore this lesson.

That is why today we need a profound and a realistic assessment of the extent and nature of the democratic changes which were made, as well as the trends in the future development of political reform.

Our strategy, as well as our political style, as the most influential political force in the opposition, must be based on this assessment.

### **The Political Reform Needs a New Phase: The Further Strengthening and Development of Democratic Institutions and Organizations**

Changes in all elements of the political system were initiated and have been taking place since 10 November 1989. Their depth and dynamics are exceptionally important to the development of the overall conversion to a new democratic society.

What are the essential changes in the political system of our society?

The party was separated from the state. The political monopoly of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] was eliminated.

A normal parliamentary cycle is taking place. It has already included two consecutive free and democratic elections. The activities of the Grand National Assembly were concluded with the adoption of a new democratic constitution. We have a second working parliament.

The real separation of the powers on all levels has been initiated.

Dozens of political parties, movements, clubs, and associations were founded and are active. Although not consistently, the functioning of a new type of a pluralistic political system has been started.

There is real freedom of speech, press, and publishing.

The foundations are being laid for a civil society in Bulgaria.

In general, these are the essential positive features of the initiated radical political change. Their birth and initial development are laying the foundations of our parliamentary democracy.

Unfortunately, along with the positive changes, a number of negative and dangerous trends became apparent in our actual political life, trends which are delaying, deforming, and threatening the very development of the democratization process.

The weakness of the established democratic institutions and the growing political confrontation are starting to erode the recently laid democratic foundations. There have been manifestations of a disparity and, occasionally, a conflict among the structural changes in the political system and the developing political processes. Corrections must be made in the trends of development of the political reform. The significance of such trends determines the existence of an essentially new phase in its development.

What are the more noticeable disparities?

The state, which was freed from political monopoly, has still not found adequate mechanisms for the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory functions. The struggle against totalitarianism is being confused with the struggle against statehood in general, and a nihilistic attitude toward statehood is developing.

Regardless of its intensive activities, the parliament has still not become a firm foundation for a parliamentary democracy.

The institution of the presidency has still not become one which stands above the parties as the national guarantor of social peace and national security. The president and his team occasionally themselves create social stress and political confrontation through their occasionally hasty actions and strong bias in favor of the blues.

The judiciary is clearly lagging behind in democratic changes. Judicial supervision and the administration of justice have not become an independent unit of higher social control which can instill a high degree of social trust.

The executive branch is weak and inefficient. The government does not have a clear program. So far, it has not proved through its actions that it is able to provide strong and competent management of the already initiated processes of radical reform to guarantee democracy and domestic stability, and to wage an efficient struggle against unemployment, black marketeering, and crime.

The development of democratic processes in local administrations has fallen greatly behind.

It is clear that the basic foundations of democratic society remain unstable. Their further assertion, strengthening, and development, and the surmounting of the old inertias and newly appearing undemocratic

trends should be the main content of the present phase in the development of the political reform.

Another substantial part of negative phenomena and trends in political life is the manifestation of general immaturity and inconsistency displayed by political parties.

Both the reformed BSP as well as the old parties which have resumed activities are slow to adapt to the variety and dynamics and to the new forms and principles of contemporary political life.

The dozens of new political groups, which lack a clearly distinct social and organizational base, ideological orientation, and political behavior, are also contributing to the disparity between changes and specific positive results on the political scene. Intraparty struggles, the self-seeking aspiration to power and leadership are dominating normal relations among parties. There is a lack of clear political ideas, which deprives the political process of consistency, stability, purposefulness, and perspectives. Passions and emotions prevail over political realism.

Paradoxically, in the course of the struggle for the elimination of our party's political monopoly, the political monopoly of other parties appeared. Particularly strong are the monopolistic manifestations of the extreme right within the SDS. We notice an aspiration toward reideologizing and resumed partisanship in the sociopolitical life and even within some state, economic, scientific, and other structures.

One of the major negative features of the present political configuration, given the abundance of political parties, is the lack of a center and of a left-wing political bloc. This increases polarization and lowers the effect of the activities of democratic forces.

The unfinished process of social restructuring, the insufficient differentiation of interests, and a grave social crisis are predetermining and necessitating the existence of an influential left-wing and a stable center. In this respect as well, however, the political process is developing illogically and negatively.

Today the most typical and most dangerous manifestation of our pluralistic political system is the sharp bipolar political confrontation. The SDS-BSP confrontation dominates and is escalating political tensions. The particular feature here is that the high level of political tension existing between the two political forces is permanent and remains almost unaffected by pre- and postelectoral periods. In itself, this fact proves that our political life is still far from having adopted the style and standards of the developed pluralistic systems, and that the political reform must reach a more advanced phase.

Equally threatening to the development of democracy is the existence and the fast strengthening of the DPS as a political and parliamentary force which, as some of its

actions indicate, could play not only a decisive but, in the more distant future, a separatist role as well.

The comprehensively manifested political polarization, the lack of a balancing center, vulgar anticommunism, the underdeveloped functions of the state authorities, and insufficient political standards and democratic traditions present a real threat to our democratic development.

The conclusion is that the development of the political reform so far has still not yielded lasting political results and that it needs a new democratic impetus. The political reform remains in its early stage. It has not been able to resolve, on a stable and firm basis, the fundamental problems of the transition to a democratic society. In some areas even critical situations could develop.

Hence our basic tasks in this area:

First, the further assertion of a peaceful transition as a basic political strategy which would save Bulgaria.

Second, the struggle for further assertion and development of the basic democratic institutions and the observance of the constitution.

Third, strengthening the role of the BSP as the basic factor in the democratic reform of the political system and in the strengthening of democratic institutions.

#### **The Threat of a Political Turn to the Extreme Right Is a Basic Feature of the Postelectoral Political Situation**

As one may clearly see, from the very first days of parliamentary activities, a drastic extreme right turn in our political life was noted. This was particularly clearly manifested in parliamentary activities and in the activities of the executive branch. A political course by the extreme right-wing within the SDS, which is a threat to democracy, is becoming apparent.

What are the more specific manifestations of this course?

The categorical rejection of forming a coalition government despite the fact that only 34 percent of the electorate voted for the SDS.

The official refusal of the SDS cabinet to submit a program for its activities, which should be discussed in the parliament, and the initiation of repressive laws aimed against the BSP, the left-wing forces, and the cooperatives.

The refusal to hold parliamentary debates and limiting openness in parliamentary work, including topics such as the activities of the old and the formation of the new cabinet. There is a clear trend toward parliamentary diktat by the dark-blue majority which truly threatens parliamentary democracy with its restrictions, and which could result in a parliamentary crisis.

The strongly manifested gross anticommunism directed against the BSP. Neglect of specific political realities and denying the legitimacy of the BSP, which is the most

influential political force in the country, backed by one-third of the Bulgarian electorate.

Preparations being made for amending laws passed by the Grand National Assembly. Constant danger of making changes in the recently adopted democratic constitution.

Fast and unjustified administrative and managerial economic changes based on the criteria of political affiliation and loyalty. Neglect of democratic procedures and professional requirements.

Unconcealed attempts by the SDS right-wing to monopolize the development of political life and the reform, and to eliminate the participation of the opposition and of other alternative forces in it. A trend is becoming apparent of preresolving issues inside the building on 134 Rakovski. The circle of the SDS Coordination Council parliamentary majority government is beginning to close. The policies of national consensus, political dialogue, and compromise have lost their role and their presence.

Democratic gains, such as glasnost, and conducting affairs in public are being restricted substantially and daily.

These are alarming trends in our political life. Unless stopped, they could deal severe blows at democratic processes and changes in our country.

Furthermore, we cannot exclude the danger that forces of political extremism could prevail, the result of which would be the establishment of a new oligarchic or authoritarian dictatorship. The systematic and gross restriction of democratic institutions and political forces are pursuing precisely this specific line.

The steadily growing socioeconomic tension and the existence of ethnic conflicts and wounds within the country, as well as the situation in the Balkans are providing favorable grounds for such a development of the situation.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party firmly opposes any restriction of democratic processes and the use of undemocratic means. It is against a political course of confrontation, revenge, and repressions. We proclaim loudly and responsibly that the danger to democratization in Bulgaria will not come and cannot come from the BSP.

Furthermore, we must clearly indicate the danger of the extreme right-wing political course which is being imposed and implemented by the SDS. The democratic forces in the country must oppose decisively and promptly any violation of democracy.

We must accelerate the development and defense, within the limits of the constitution, of the parliament and of the democratic civil society, of an overall left-wing alternative for political reform, which would guarantee civil peace and the strengthening of democracy in Bulgaria.

**For a Sensible and Far-Sighted Policy on Ethnic Problems and Bulgarian National Security**

In the past two years the Bulgarian Socialist Party has been steadily trying to reach an agreement with the other political forces in order jointly to formulate a common national policy consistent with the new realities in Bulgaria, the Balkans, Europe, and the world.

On the initiative of our party, with the 29 December 1989 resolution and the restoration of the names of the Muslims and of citizens of Turkish ethnicity, the distortions of the so-called revival process were eliminated.

Consistent with the adopted international standards, the new Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria guarantees equal rights to all Bulgarian citizens regardless of ethnic origin, religion, or political and ideological beliefs.

Despite all this, however, alarming trends are intensifying, which create justifiable concern for Bulgaria's integrity and security.

Alienation is increasing and opposing views are becoming aggravated among ethnic communities. In areas with a mixed population the tension remains high and mistrust and confrontation are growing.

Increasingly, the DPS is showing itself as a party based on ethnic and religious grounds, which violate the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.

After the 13 October 1991 elections, the trend toward political and administrative separation of the Turkish ethnic community assumed real features in some areas where the DPS enjoys a monopoly and is not permitting the existence of other political parties.

Some political circles in the country and on the outside are instilling Turkish self-awareness in Bulgarian Muslims, forcing them to study the Turkish language as their "native" tongue.

Efforts are being made to revive in our country Macedonianism which, against the background of the processes taking place in Yugoslavia, could trigger dangerous developments.

Political organizations which are fanning nationalistic moods are intensifying their activities.

Involved in political and ideological confrontation and in their aspiration to gain more votes, some political forces frequently manipulate the national and ethnic problems, to the detriment of Bulgaria's vital interests.

As a national political party, the BSP deems it its duty to issue an open warning concerning the real danger which threatens the integrity and security of Bulgaria. We neither understand nor share the SDS assessment according to which there are no ethnic problems or threats to our national security in Bulgaria.

From the rostrum of this Congress we appeal to the parliament, the president, the executive branch, and the

political forces, with the suggestion immediately to undertake the formulation of a lasting national policy. Time does not tolerate any further delays. History will not forgive us if we fail to display wisdom and the will for a lasting resolution of the issues which determine the future existence of Bulgaria as a united and independent country.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party opposes nationalism and chauvinism as well as national nihilism and efforts at national divisiveness.

We shall engage in most active and exceptionally responsible participation in the formulation and implementation of a well-conceived, above-party, modern strategy and policy on the ethnic problem.

**Reform in the Economic and Social Areas in the Interest of the Working People**

Comrades:

Our party's economic policy was presented in our electoral platform. Under the new conditions, after the elections, now that the party is in opposition, we need its further development on the basis of clear positions on the economic reform under way.

With the formation of its one-party cabinet, the SDS assumed total responsibility for the direction, development, and condition of the economic reform.

For the past year, Bulgaria has lived with the concerns of the initiated reform of a conversion to a market economy, which is starting under conditions marked by a grave economic crisis. Millions of Bulgarians are experiencing exceptional difficulties and privations, in the belief that they are thus contributing to the preservation of civil peace, the success of the reform, and the survival of the nation. However, the recession is continuing, the crisis is intensifying and the economy is exposed to the threat of collapse.

The "model" of the economic reform, adopted by the SDS, and the means of its implementation are subject to major criticism.

We know that the government opted for the neoliberal type of reform and the supershock therapy required for its implementation. It proclaimed the withdrawal of the state from the economy and assumed the position of an observer in the uncontrolled shaping of the market. It allowed the extreme destruction of its foundations, which are production and consumption.

Without making an overall program public, the government undertook the economic reform by liberalizing prices, including the interest rate, introducing a floating market exchange rate, applying a greatly restrictive budgetary and credit policy, and taking steps to reduce consumption. These are standard measures which were recommended by the International Monetary Fund for pulling a market economy out of a depression. Unfortunately, the Bulgarian economy is still not one of them.



The purpose of such measures was to implement the objectives of the so-called first stabilization stage of the reform: to reduce and control inflation, by reducing domestic consumption, to redirect resources toward exports and increase foreign currency income, to stimulate savings for the purpose of investments and attracting foreign capital for the restructuring and technological renovation of the production process and protect the socially weak population strata. In the final account, the purpose of these tasks was to revive industry and to create conditions for converting to the second stage of the reform: replacing the command system with a market economy system.

What results have been achieved so far?

Ten months after the initiation of the reform, the condition of the national economy has exceeded even the most pessimistic forecasts. The drastic restrictive measures which were taken for stabilization purposes also blocked production and consumption.

After a 10-12 percent drop in output in 1990, compared to 1989, a new decline of about 20-22 percent is becoming apparent for this year. In the first nine months of 1991, compared with the same period of 1990, production declined most severely in the electrical engineering industry and electronics, by 43 percent; in ferrous metallurgy, by 37 percent; in the chemical and petroleum refining industries, by 35 percent; and in the textile industry, by 34 percent. In 1991 industrial output will reach 60 percent of the level it has attained two years ago. There has been a great decrease in the number of cattle and, therefore, in the production of meat, milk, and food products.

One of the tasks of the reform—increasing foreign currency income by reducing domestic consumption and increasing exports was “overfulfilled” only in the aspect of reducing and restructuring consumption, for currently nine-tenths of the citizens earn below the socially necessary minimum. This withering of consumption, however, did not lead to increased exports or greater foreign exchange revenue. In the first nine months of this year exports declined by 56 percent compared to the same period in 1990. The positive balance which was achieved was due, above all, to the drastic reduction in imports, by 71 percent for the first nine months, and the consequences of this will be felt quite soon.

The purpose of the reform was to stimulate savings and attract foreign capital for the restructuring and technical renovation of the production process. No serious progress has been noted in either area. The economic organizations are not investing because they are working in an extremely uncertain economic environment—inflation, lack of markets, rising interest and credit restrictions, the familiar unjustified reorganizations, and political pressure. The high economic and political instability in our country make foreign investors quite cautious. The population as well reacted in familiar ways.

We know that during periods of inflation and uncertainty savings rise. However, since the purchasing power of current income, has dropped (by a factor of 2.5 over the past two years) and the people barely manage to survive, they show no inclinations to invest in economic activities.

The government struggled most systematically for limiting and controlling inflation. It took steps to reduce consumption by the population (real income) for limiting loans to enterprises, and for drastically reducing state budget subsidies and other expenditures. The truth is that for brief periods of time the inflationary storm quiets down but the fires of inflation are not extinguished. The state budget remains strongly negative and is still making use of substantial bank loans.

The steps which were taken to protect the income and living standard of the socially weak population categories were only partially effective, for the price liberalization led to price increases by a factor of 5-6 in January-February 1991. Inflation reduced the purchasing power of the average wage by a factor of about 2.5. The effect of the compensatory payments was partial and led to equalization in income, which does not stimulate labor.

Unemployment reached the 400,000 level, excluding some 200,000 people who emigrated for economic reasons, and some 70,000 people who took forced unpaid leave for lack of work. Expectations that unemployment will increase with the initiated restructuring of the economy is frankly horrifying the people. Black marketeering and economic crime are assuming a large scale.

The drop in real consumption, mass impoverishment, and unemployment are the logical consequences and the inevitable foundations of the type of economic reform adopted by the government. It is time, however, to realize that we have already reached the threshold beyond which economic ties break down and social tension becomes explosive.

Which are the main reasons for this state of the economy and the reform?

The reasons are varied. Some of them are the consequences of the policy pursued in the course of the previous decades.

Our party, as the ideologue and promoter of the system of centralized directive-based planning, founded on the total domination of state ownership, bears a great deal of responsibility for the present crisis. We belatedly made a political assessment of the historical failure of this model of development and the inevitable crisis resulting from its application. However, even after 10 November 1989, when this assessment was made and the party of the Bulgarian socialists had its own government and parliamentary majority and could have undertaken the economic reform, it was unable to do so. The worsening of the international situation following the collapse of the CEMA market, the growing economic isolation, and the destructive role of the SDS do not account for all the



reasons for the delay of the economic reform and the responsibility of the leadership and the government for such a delay.

The economic reform was initiated by the Popov coalition government. Unlike its predecessor, that government enjoyed the support both of the parliament and the trade unions.

The monetaristic steps which were taken for the purpose of stabilization were not backed by real measures for demonopolizing and for developing and restructuring the production process. Under the conditions of monopoly structures and the lack of a competitive market environment, it merely promoted inflation and speculation. On the other hand, when inflation abated in April-May, the government failed to replace the strongly restrictive measures with a policy of stimulating production. This led to the loss of a great opportunity for stirring economic activeness.

The excessive politicizing of the reform led to the disruption of the balance and the destruction of our foreign economic relations and a demonstratively scornful attitude displayed toward our traditional partners in the East European countries and the former USSR.

Hastily, governed by ideological motivations and adopting a purely administrative method, the government hastily undertook to change some organizational structures and to replace some enterprise managements. Under the slogan of "demonopolization," the chaos and destruction of the still existing production relations essentially intensified.

The ideological burdens carried by the blue economic team of the government and the political confrontation in parliament were the reasons for delays in legislation which would support the economic reform and for the imperfect nature of some of the laws which were passed.

The statement of the new prime minister to the effect that he does not need any program for the work of the government, different from the platform with which the SDS won the elections, reminds us of past policies and does not promise any changes in economic policy.

The refusal to institute changes in economic policy and this type of implementation of the reform could result in the following:

Exacerbating the errors which were made in the monetaristic approach to the reform, the intensification of the crisis and the uncontrolled play of market forces.

Further suppression of economic activeness and continued production decline; delays in the structural reorganization and technological renovation of the production process.

The adoption of a socially very expensive option for the conversion to a market economy; increased unemployment and putting large population strata in a critical situation; reduction of real income and loss of the social gains by the population.

Our party cannot support an economic reform without a government program which would clearly indicate its objectives and tasks: the target for the country and what the people should expect, and how and in what manner this reform is tied to our participation in international economic structures. The government owes its electorate and all Bulgarian citizens, all taxpayers, such a program.

The initial steps taken by the government to institute changes in economic legislation are disturbing. The suggested amendments to the Law on Ownership and Use of Farmland, the Law on Cooperatives, and others will lead to a major stratification of the Bulgarian countryside into the poor (farmhands) and the rich (bosses) with which we are familiar from the past. The coerced administrative dismantling of the cooperative farms is destroying democracy and the right of the peasants to choose for themselves the way they would use the land the ownership of which has been restored. This fast destruction of economic structures will paralyze production and could threaten the county with hunger. The elimination of private plots would disrupt family budgets of hundreds of thousands of citizens.

We categorically oppose the legislative initiatives of the government on matters of restitution and privatization, the purpose of which is to restore ownership relations and structures which existed in 1939 and which were typical of an economy which was still the bearer of much social injustice, shaped through speculations and fierce exploitation. Compensation yes but not restoration of prewar capitalism: Such is the wish of the majority of the population, and it is justified.

#### **A Specific Formulation of a Left-Wing Socialist Alternative to the Economic Reform Is Necessary**

Both the situation of the country in the European and global economy, as well as the success of domestic reforms and their social consequences depend on the choice of the type of reform.

What type of reform does the Bulgarian Socialist Party favor?

Our party favors the type of model which takes into consideration the social cost of the reform, the equitable distribution of the burdens caused by the reform, the extensive discussion and public assessment of the steps which are being taken, a reform which leads to the creation of a social market economy and not to the restoration of the old social relations.

We are in favor of a social market economy.

The BSP favors a mixed economy with pluralism in ownership, the structure of which will be based on the criteria of economic efficiency and social acceptability.

In addition to market control, a certain state control must be applied through economic means, particularly during the transitional period. It should be open to the world with a necessary protection of the interests of national capital. It must develop contemporary markets for goods and services, for capital and for manpower, and a corresponding legislation, institutions, and functioning mechanisms, while displaying the necessary realism.

The reform leading to a social market economy should give power to the economically industrious, talented, and enterprising citizens. This would guarantee a broad social support and a basis for the reform.

From that viewpoint, the BSP should formulate its strategy and tactic for the forthcoming agrarian reform, privatization, restitution, demonopolization, and decentralization of the economy. Our parliamentary group must come out with its own legislative initiatives and develop and defend them in parliamentary debates.

The BSP must struggle for a shift in emphases and mechanisms for the implementation of the reform. Restrictive measures should be replaced by greater measures of encouragement.

Such measures are required by the current condition of the production process. We need immediate steps to be taken by the government to restructure the production process, temporarily to subsidize some production lines and activities, mainly in agriculture, to appropriate budget funds to finance state orders and to provide state loans or state guarantees for bank loans for the opening of new jobs.

The restructuring of the production process must take place along with its technological updating, on the basis of the latest achievements of scientific and technical progress and global experience. This presumes a strategy founded on unified structural, investment, and innovation policy. This calls for providing conditions for the use of the country's entire scientific and technical potential, and stimulating the initiative of the scientific and technical intelligentsia.

The state must encourage and regulate through economic means the priority areas which could become centers of economic revival. This applies to agriculture and industries directly related to it; international tourism; the infrastructure; production facilities oriented toward exports in the fields of electronics, machine building, and the chemical industry.

The BSP demands for agriculture to be given real support and state encouragement in order more successfully to adapt to the conditions of a market competition (as is the case in all developed countries). Agriculture needs lower interest rates, state investments, a substantial improvement and development of the infrastructure of agricultural production, the strengthening of agricultural finances, and an efficient system for produce purchasing, storing, and processing.

### **The Social Protection of the Working People Is the Nucleus of Our Policy**

As an opposition party, the BSP could rely on influence and support mainly by defending the interests and resolving the problems of individual social groups, of the working people.

A strong social policy can be implemented only on the basis of a properly functioning economy. Such an economy would provide an income to the working people and maximally protect those who are unable to protect themselves. For that reason, the BSP will constructively participate in the creation of an economic legislation for the reform as well, guided by the interests of the majority of the population. It will categorically oppose a policy which leads to excessive property stratification and social confrontation. We shall systematically defend the right of the citizens to private property and income and equal participation in the process of privatization and encouragement of enterprise under the protection of the laws. The BSP favors the development of all forms of agricultural and other cooperatives, based on our traditions, global experience, and the wishes of the owners themselves. The type of economic system to which we aspire should be socially oriented and its purpose should be to improve the life of the ordinary people.

More than at any other time, it is necessary clearly to define our social policy in terms of demographic development, protection of the family, the birth rate and the children, as well as ending the emigration of young people based on economic considerations.

Our policy of labor employment and struggle against excessive unemployment should be based on the principle of the maximal and efficient employment of able-bodied citizens, strict control over the loss of jobs, extensive incentives for the opening of new jobs, creating a widespread system for retraining, and aid to the unemployed.

Our parliamentary group must display initiative in the drafting of new labor and social legislation, and setting up institutions and mechanisms for contracting and hiring manpower and protecting hired labor; developing of a modern labor exchange and mechanisms and procedures for settling labor and social disputes and conflicts; having a pluralistic organization of social security funds and providing access to a health insurance system.

### **Efficient Participation in Local Government—Basic Field of BSP Work**

Our party must have a clear and substantiated regional policy. Its objectives are further democratization of territorial administration, assertion of the autonomy of local self-government, and a stable territorial development.

Lately, social tension in the territorial units has increased. One of the main reasons for this is the way in which the economic reform is being implemented, and

the unconstructive behavior of right-wing political forces. Social tension has become aggravated in some territorial units as a result of high unemployment, ethnic confrontation, transportation difficulties, a decline in spiritual life, intensified income stratification, etc.

Favorable conditions for the BSP for work in the local administrations appeared after the elections. In accordance with modern requirements and the nature of the BSP, we must ensure the protection of the interests of the broadest possible strata of the working population. At the same time, we must provide constructive support for political and economic reforms. This means that the following issues should be the focal points of our work: restoring and ensuring order, legality and security in the respective territories; making active efforts to preserve and open new jobs in order to prevent unemployment from exceeding the critical threshold in the individual territorial units; implementation of a new housing policy according to which the municipality would provide housing to the socially weak households; specific actions aimed at preserving and restoring the environment; ensuring reliable and inexpensive communal transportation and development of the technical infrastructure, such as water supplies, electrification, heat supplies, communications, etc.; maintaining the normal functioning of the health care, education, culture, and social welfare systems in the territorial units; concern for improving supplies with basic comestible goods and services; developing regional conditions for the revival of the production process, with particular attention being paid to contemporary forms of cooperatives.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party will struggle for ensuring the independent and autonomous budgets of municipalities and settlements. Municipal ownership, as a stable source of income, plays a substantial role in this case. Such ownership must be increased through the restructuring of state into municipal ownership and through efficient management and administration.

The local authorities must apply democratic work processes, "transparency" and openness, guaranteeing the right of participation by the citizens in the resolution of local issues through meetings, referendums and other forms.

In brief, the Bulgarian Socialist Party must pay incomparably greater attention and dedicate time and cadres to its efficient participation in local government. Currently, vitally important problems to the working people are being resolved in those areas and the socialists are the ones who should ensure their just resolution.

**The Bulgarian Socialist Party Must Become a New, Modern Left-Wing Socialist Party. Greater Clarity, More Work, and More Real Changes Are Needed as Well as Fewer Imitations and Judges**

Comrades:

The most important issue facing the 40th Congress is that of analyzing the problem of party changes. Its

proper resolution is linked both to the direct survival as well as the historical future of the BSP. That is why in the study of this issue we must display mature political responsibility and merciless realism in our analysis, as well as fearless optimism.

We must realize that it is a question of the fate of the party, of our 100-year-old party.

We must not be afraid of seeing reality as it is and not as we would like it to be.

We must be fervent in our will to change the present condition rather than use it for selfish purposes.

It is impossible to consider all problems of the process of changing the party. The need to pursue the work based on the Manifesto and the ideological platform adopted at the 14th Extraordinary and 39th Regular Congresses is becoming increasingly obvious. We need a long-term programmatic plan which will fill up the ideological vacuum in the party's present development and reorganization. This plan must duplicate the experience of the German Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of the Left in Italy, and the Spanish Socialist Labor Party, which, over a long period of time, developed such plans concerning the type of parties they would like to become and the objectives they set themselves.

This Congress should adopt a resolution on this issue and assign this difficult task to the collective of politicians, scientists, and other socialists whose leader should be approved by the Congress.

This does not mean that the debate on such matters should be either postponed or limited. Today the issues related to change are the most urgent among those which face the party. That is also the way they appeared at the pre-congress meetings and conferences. It is clear that they will constitute the core of the Congress' debate as well.

What issues are we submitting to your attention?

#### **A Clear and Contemporary Definition of the Concept of "New Party"**

This issue is a sharply debatable one both within and outside the party.

On the outside, we are being accused of the fact that there are no changes but only simulations within the BSP. We can answer this charge as follows: Do not be mistaken, Gentlemen, it is not the old BCP but a new party which exists on the Bulgarian political stage. The motivation for our change is not a simulation but the new global, European, and national realities and the need for a new party supporting socialist ideas and values.

Within the Bulgarian Socialist Party itself, there circulate a variety of "visions" concerning changes. They

cover a very broad spectrum, from orthodox Marxists-Leninists to right-wing social democratic and labor party views on change.

As we know, there also are extreme views: neo-Stalinists, elitist, or openly liquidationist.

This is normal in the present stage of our change. Today we have more questions than answers. On the other hand, the party is what it is now, in 1991, and it is as such that it must walk the distance of its profound and radical change.

A more essential point is that two basic views of the Bulgarian Socialist Party as a new party have already become crystallized in the course of the reform process itself.

The first is the one demanding the social democratization of the BSP and sharply criticizing its slow social democratic transformation.

The second insists on the restructuring of the BSP into a modern left-wing socialist party, as part of the global and European Left.

These are neither theoretical nor abstract but sharply political debates and trends within the party at the present stage in its change.

The social democratization of the Bulgarian Socialist Party is the easiest and fastest but not the most accurate method for changing the party. It means, in the Bulgarian context, going back 40 to 50 years; in the context of the world social democratic movement it means acknowledging the need for renovation, for it is precisely that which is currently being done by the strongest social democratic parties.

We need a profound reassessment of the type of party as it was in the past and the type of party we would like the BSP to become now.

The entire world is going through a transitional phase which creates a crisis in the present criteria, structures, principles, and views.

In most general terms, the Bulgarian Socialist Party is in a time of profound change, of transition from one state to another, from one type of party to another. The nature of this transition is the main issue.

The bolshevik type of party, which is what the BCP became after 1919, is historically obsolete and inconsistent with the present new realities, new problems, and new trends of development. We need a new political party.

A modern left-wing socialist party, an organic part of the European and world left, could be such a new party.

The experience and the searches conducted by the strongest and most progressive postcommunist and social democratic parties, such as the former Italian Communist Party, the German Social Democratic Party, the

Spanish Social Democratic Party, and so on, indicate that we are on the right path, for that is precisely the way we formulated some time ago the strategy and nature of our change. These parties are advancing in the same direction. The Italian Communist Party even renamed itself "Democratic Party of the Italian Left."

This is not to say that we are rejecting our 100-year-old history. Nothing of the kind. We shall retain the best of all of its periods and lay it at the foundations of our new party. Buzludzha and the rose will always symbolize our historical continuity and development.

However, Bulgaria needs a new left-wing party, radically different from a communist party. Bolshevism is history. We are not engaging in a political maneuver but in a profound transformation of the party into a new party.

What do we mean by a "new party"?

It is a modern party, a new type of political structure. It is the product of a new time, capable of thinking and shaping its policy and acting in accordance with the new realities and development trends in the world, in Europe, and in Bulgaria.

It is a left-wing party. It is an indivisible part of the European and world Left, whose objective is to participate in the creation of a left-wing alternative in resolving the problems of the world, of Europe, and of Bulgaria.

It is a reformist party. It relies not on violent changes but on radical reforms. It is the party of a new, of a reformist style of thought and action, aimed at improving society under conditions of catastrophic threat to the destruction of man and life, as well as unprecedented opportunities for the advancement of human civilization.

It is a democratic party. It rejects the principle of democratic centralism. It acknowledges the need for ideological pluralism within society and within itself. We are aware of the value of differences and of the creative nature of debates both within the party and within the entire left. Democracy is the political standard of the new party.

We remain a socialist party. Socialist ideas and values are our social ideal, and their achievement in the development of society is our goal. We are in favor of drawing all the lessons from the allowed distortions of socialism and for its enrichment with the achievements of contemporary civilization. The BSP struggles for the socialism of the future, which is not an abstract model but an ideological and practical correction of society.

It is not socialism which separates us from the Bulgarian and the global social democracy. It is precisely socialism which today brings us closer and binds us and, in the future, will unite us. History and practical experience will determine when this future will become reality. One thing we can say with certainty: Historically, we have split and historically we shall unite. The Bulgarian Socialist Party once again confirms its awareness of the possibility of joining the Socialist International.

Finally, the Bulgarian Socialist Party is a united party. Although we adopt pluralism of thought we cannot become a party unable to organize itself for the sake of practical action. Although we reject democratic centralism, we must not abandon the principles of majority and democratic unity. We must not confuse debates with disorganization, differences of opinion with internal party quarrels, and free support of our own views with the freedom to engage in behind the scenes intrigues and divisive actions.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party must be a strong party which can govern itself if it wants to convince the voters that it could govern the country.

Such is the type of new party that we would like to become as a result of our changes. This will be a difficult evolutionary process which will involve short-term, medium-term, and long-term changes.

The true reformers are the forces and circles within the party which are simultaneously promoting or advancing these three types of changes. Delays or haste, if not demagogic, lead either to stagnation or to adventures.

The conclusion is clear. What are needed are true and lasting changes and not ossified stereotypes, nostalgic views, verbal rushes or alarmist simulations of change. We need daily work for change within the party as well as working reformers.

Such is the past and such are the forces of reform of the party.

We are on the right way, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party has all the opportunities for becoming a new modern left-wing socialist party.

#### **For a Realistic Assessment of the Party's Condition**

However prejudicially or speculatively we may analyze the party condition, we can neither deny nor belittle the essential changes which have been accomplished within it. Suffice it to indicate the following: rejection of power monopoly; assertion of political pluralism and dialogue with the other parties; the Manifesto and the Platform; rejection of democratic centralism; democratization of party ideological and political life; reregistration and renaming of the party; formulation of a strategy for a peaceful transition; reassessment of the question of the party's property and responsibility; etc.

The party is changing, painfully, less rapidly than it should, and unevenly in various areas and circles but, unquestionably, it is changing in accordance with the strategy earmarked at the 14th and 39th Congresses.

Naturally, we cannot be satisfied either with the pace or the depth of the changes taking place. What was accomplished remains below the level of requirements and the dynamics of social processes in our country. Of late we have noticed an increase in the activities of conservatives and a certain hardening in a considerable segment of the party.

Such trends, which hinder change, must be surmounted. We must provide even broader opportunities for reformist processes and forces within the party.

Despite upheavals and weaknesses, the BSP is holding its 40th Congress in relatively good condition. It not only survived but has remained the largest and strongest political party in the country, enjoying nationwide influence and significance. The organizational structure of the BSP encompasses 278 municipal organizations, 13,099 primary organizations, and interest clubs. By 11 November 1991, according to the records, it had 476,840 members. After 10 November 1989 the party gained another 44,563 members, 12,625 of them under the age of 30. In one year and two months, after the 39th Congress, more than 10,000 new members have joined the BSP.

Compared to the 14th Congress, the number of primary party organizations declined by 18,055. This decline is due mainly to depolitization and the fact that enterprise primary party organizations left the enterprises.

The interest clubs were not able to adapt to the new conditions everywhere and specifically to formulate the object of their activities. Some municipalities took the line of closing down the clubs and registering their members in the primary organizations at their place of residence. The automatic adoption of this line failed to yield positive results in some areas. Most municipalities are aware of the need to preserve the clubs and to restore them wherever their closing down was an error. Under the new circumstances, greater efforts must be made to strengthen the clubs and precisely to determine the nature of their activities and to make them more active. Most working socialists are precisely members of the clubs. The protection of their social, professional, political, and cultural rights and interests is assuming primary significance. This especially applies to the present circumstances, when the harassment of socialists throughout the country is intensifying.

The task is to strengthen rather than close down the clubs. Today the primary party organizations and the clubs must become hubs for a variety of political, ideological, organization, social, and other activities.

Compared to the 14th Congress, BSP membership declined by one-half. Nearly 180,000 members left the party as a result of the Law on Depolitization.

Some honest people left the BSP for a variety of reasons but maintained their attachment to the socialist idea and are voting with the red ballot. Some are leaving the party because they find it difficult to withstand the hostile atmosphere and daily persecution and threats. There also are those who, for a variety of reasons, are disappointed in the BSP; others are confused and dissatisfied, and there are those who yield to aggressive antisocialist manipulations. They leave the party without becoming antisocialist. We must understand such people and not condemn them irrevocably, and we must continue to work honestly with them.

A substantial number of people demonstratively left the party, changed color and switched to the SDS. These are primarily careerists, belated "victims" of totalitarianism and "active fighters" against it. These are people who, under the new system, would like to assume command positions and hold profitable and advantageous jobs. There also are strange "theatrical" and "butterfly" cases. Some of them are today among the most aggressive elements in their struggle for the elimination of the BSP, thus hoping to earn the benevolence of the new regime. These are seasonal political individuals. We should not regret losing them, for their withdrawal rids the party of careerists and dishonorable people.

Today BSP membership is a matter of honor and deep faith in the idea of socialism and belief in the program and policies of the party and readiness to participate in its conversion into a new party. Today BSP membership does not bring personal benefits and privileges. It rather brings discomfort and, sometimes, danger. That is why we want to express the Congress' admiration for the 500,000 worthy men and women who, despite difficulties, abuse and slander, despite threats, remain members of the BSP and actively participate in its activities. We express our gratitude with great warmth and acknowledgment to the nearly 2 million voters who did not yield to fear and who, despite pressures, manipulations, and threats, supported us in the last elections.

The preCongress meetings and conferences are particularly indicative of the party's condition.

Above all, we must emphasize this, the meetings and conferences indicated that even despite the present rather worse political conditions, the BSP is politically stable. It is not afraid. It is active and displays a fighting spirit. This is exceptionally important and must be properly assessed.

Second, the party proved that it is not in a state of political decline but is capable of acting. It carried out major political actions related to the present situation and the negative trends in our political and social life.

Third, the meetings and conferences indicated that the critical awareness within the party has increased. Dissatisfaction with the condition and the work of the party organizations was noted in a number of areas. Party policy was subjected to critical analysis and evaluation; dissatisfaction was voiced with its organizational and ideological condition and the activities of the parliamentary group and the status and activities of the party's leadership.

Fourth, the meetings and conferences turned into a demonstration of the will and energy to accelerate change within the party. At the same time, also obstructionist trends became apparent at such meetings.

Fifth, the desire of the party for unity, understood as the ability for political action while preserving differences in the conditions of the individual trends, was manifested strongly. Mutual trust, comradeship, cohesion and unity

predominated, qualities the significance of which has strongly increased today. However, there also were manifestations of intolerance.

### The Party's Social Base

Generally speaking, the party's social base reflects the age, educational, and professional structure of our society.

The age breakdown of BSP members is as follows: under 30, 6.02 percent; 31-40, 17.11 percent; 41-50, 21.88 percent; 51-60, 21.38 percent; and over 60, 33.61 percent.

The majority are people in the working-age group. However, the aging trend in the party's structure remains. This is obvious also in the BSP electorate.

The party's influence among the youth, particularly university students, is extremely unsatisfactory. The right-wing wave which is flooding Bulgaria and all of East Europe, as well as the aggressive antisocialist hysteria are being reflected in the young people's way of thinking and behavior.

The main reasons, however, lie within the party itself, in its policies, behavior, and activities. The BSP can hope for a positive change in the young toward it only if in the parliament and in society it becomes their true spokesman and the defender of their interests.

The young will trust the BSP if they become convinced that it is indeed the bearer of the new, of social justice, humanism, legality, and moral virtues.

We shall not be successful among the young if we do not correct the lack of constant contacts with them and learn to listen to and talk with it, to understand it, to believe in its abilities and moral purity and patriotism.

Our contacts with youth and student organizations remain weak; the help which we must give them as a socialist party is not always sufficient or competent.

In terms of education, the breakdown of BSP members is as follows: advanced, 19.66 percent; higher, 7.45 percent; secondary, 41.74 percent; primary, 31.16 percent.

The BSP influence is greater among the less well-educated electoral strata.

Claims that the entire intelligentsia has withdrawn from the BSP and that it has turned against it are untrue and largely speculative; 51,637 BSP members are doctors and candidates of sciences, noted men of culture and the arts, working in education and health care, engineers, and technicians. This figure is quite convincing.

As we emphasized, the issue of the place and role of the intelligentsia in the BSP remains unresolved. We would be wrong to judge the entire intelligentsia only on the basis of those of its members who are most active in the struggle against the BSP and the socialist ideas, and who

have the widest possible access to national mass information media. It would be an even greater error to underestimate the insufficient participation of some circles of the intelligentsia, particularly of part of the artistic-creative intelligentsia, in BSP activities. We must recognize that we have still not found ways for the active involvement of the intelligentsia in the formulation and implementation of party theory and policy. This is a basic problem for the BSP.

The study of the party's social structure indicates a substantial drop in the number of industry workers. Their share declined by 70 percent. In the last elections a relatively small percentage of industrial workers voted for us. This as well is an alarming trend.

Under the new circumstances, we are not aspiring to be a class party of the old type. The social structure of the country is changing and the party structure, like the structure of the electorate, cannot fail to reflect such changes.

As a left-wing socialist party, in the future as well the BSP will remain essentially the party of hired labor. Our primary task is to regain the trust of industrial workers in the BSP. Both in the parliament and in society, at work and at home, the BSP must be spokesman for and defender of the working people. There is no other way for recapturing the trust of the working people.

The BSP has a stable influence in the villages. There, however, major changes are taking place, which we must take into consideration. The BSP has a future in the Bulgarian countryside by becoming the initiator and active force in the implementation of the agrarian reform in the interest of the people, asserting itself as spokesman for and defender of their interests. This means that the party must become the bearer of the cooperative idea, of a reform which will not degenerate into the restoration of the past but which will lead us forward, toward modern cooperative forms in agriculture, without opposing the existence of private farms. We are in favor of observing and applying the Law on the Land, as it was passed by the Grand National Assembly. The amendments which the ruling coalition is suggesting are aimed essentially against the interests of the working people in agriculture.

#### **For a Contemporary Cadre Status of the Party**

After 10 November, a real cadre revolution took place in the party. New people were elected as democratically as possible to the leaderships of the primary organizations, interest clubs, municipal and regional councils, and the BSP Supreme Council. They were primarily young, educated, and authoritative in the party and society. Most of them rapidly plunged into party work and showed their skill in finding their way in the complex political and social situation and gain valuable experience. New leaders, enjoying popularity and authority in the party and the country, developed.

Today 60,000 socialists are members of the leaderships of the primary organizations and interest clubs; there are 8,000 in the municipal councils and the Supreme Council; there are 106 National Assembly deputies, 1,986 mayors of municipalities and settlements, and 4,521 municipal council members were elected with the red ballots. To these we must add also 157 deputies in the Grand National Assembly, who were not re-elected, as well as 134 who were members of our ticket for the National Assembly and more than 10,000 people included in the tickets for mayors and municipal council members. Many socialists are active in working with youth, student, trade union, women's, ecological, cultural, civic, and other organizations and movements. Thousands of socialists worked with dedication during the electoral campaigns and are active in general party activities. These are valuable BSP cadres, people who are honest and worthy, people who are daring, who did not yield to blackmail and manipulations, insults and slanders, who did not bend in the face of threats.

At the same time, however, some weaknesses were manifested which, unless we eliminate them, would have unpleasant consequences. The line of total renovation of the party leaderships, which was adopted two years ago, played, as a rule, a major positive role. Today the party is experiencing an urgent need for and even a shortage of professional politicians with the type of experience, qualities and skills developed under the new political conditions. The party must be able to identify these young politicians and provide conditions for their growth, and pay attention to and show concern for them.

The use of terms, with the idea that conferences and congresses will be held every year, which would be inexpedient, at least in the immediate future, does not provide such conditions. The fact that a number of capable party figures resigned at the accountability conferences and withdrew from party work is alarming and must be seriously analyzed.

Clearly, we need a new party cadre policy, and concern for promising cadres, including the training of young cadres abroad, in countries with stable democratic traditions and standards, and with influential left-wing socialist and democratic parties.

#### **For a Strong Democratic and United Party Leadership**

Over the past two years, the BSP has acted under exceptionally difficult circumstances. Its survival as a basic factor in Bulgarian political life is due, to a decisive extent, to the properly chosen political strategy. Its formulation is owed to the entire leading corps of the party, including the Supreme Council, and the presidency.

For a while there was a real danger that the BSP would become divided, as occurred in similar parties in the other East European countries. This threat was manifested in the party's leadership and was reflected in its condition.

At the same time, both in terms of structure and status, the party's leadership was deliberately chosen in such a way as to avoid any split. It was precisely the prevention of a division within the BSP that was the main objective which could be achieved not only with the right policy but also with the proper structure, work style, and atmosphere within the party's leadership.

This was the proper cadre policy. It was expressed not in a lack of understanding of the advantages of a united leadership but the realized need for a united leadership which would bring the party together and maintain its unity.

In turn, the party status was also reflected in the leadership, in its individual members. The leadership could not remain isolated from the processes and changes within the party in its ways of thinking and attitude toward events and participation in the changes.

The condition of the party's leadership is known to the party. It was actively discussed at pre-congress meetings and conferences.

It is clear today that in order for the transformation into a new party to become faster, the BSP needs a new leadership which must surmount some of the major shortcomings of the old one.

We must continue to preserve democracy and the atmosphere of debates and support of individual views.

At the same time, however, we must surmount phenomena, such as the self-isolation of the leadership, lack of teamwork, the prevalence of phraseology compared to work, behind-the-scenes actions, and lack of comradeship and moral purity in some actions committed by individuals.

That is precisely why we need a new leadership consisting of reformers, of individuals who have different viewpoints and the courage to defend them, but also people who display comradeship, tolerance, and loyalty, i.e., who work as a team. These must be working reformers who, through their actions, would prove their reformist views and role in party activities and changes.

We must put an end to a situation in which occasionally the harshest critics of unsolved problems turn out to be precisely those who are responsible for their resolution. We must look the truth in the eye and realize that one of

the dangers facing the party in this difficult time is precisely the absence of such a strong and united reform-minded leadership.

We need new people and new faces. We need capable people and clean faces.

The Congress will act properly by discussing the specific responsibility of the chairman and the deputy chairmen of the Supreme Council and of every member of the Presidency. This is needed less for the sake of a just assessment than for that of the most correct resolution of the problem of the future BSP leadership, for this issue is one of the decisive prerequisites for its preservation and further change.

At this Congress the party must shape a leadership which will be able to protect and change it, to unite it and lead it intelligently and efficiently in the forthcoming exceptionally difficult period.

Dear Comrades:

As we may see, hard times for work, trials, and changes facing the Bulgarian Socialist Party are becoming apparent in the immediate future.

Heavy responsibilities and challenges have been laid by history on the shoulders of the present generations of Bulgarian Socialists.

However, there also are beneficial objectives: the building of a democratic Bulgaria and of the new Bulgarian Socialist Party.

Get rid of your depression, which is a condition of those who are weak and faint-hearted.

Live with the intellectual and social daring of the European and world Left.

Open your hearts: Let the cleansed ideal of socialism beat within them. Socialism is the most beautiful creation of the social mind of mankind.

Let us jointly build a new Bulgarian Socialist Party as a modern left-wing socialist party and let us together face the difficulties and jointly work for the future of socialism and for the socialism of the future!

I thank you for your attention!



**Meciar's StB Links, 'Law Breaking' Examined**  
AU0903102592

[Editorial Report] Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 27 February, 3 March, and 5 March, and Prague RESPEKT in Czech No. 9 (2 to 8 March) published several interviews and articles investigating the past of Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], and former Slovak prime minister. The articles and interviews examine Meciar's contacts with the StB [State Security] police prior to the revolution and his activities as Slovak minister of interior (January to June 1990), when he is alleged to have removed from StB archives compromising material about himself. In a Prague RESPEKT in Czech commentary that winds up the periodical's investigations, commentator Milan Zitny considers the possible political repercussions of the latest revelations about Meciar's past.

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 27 February and 3 March, on page 7 in each instance, publishes in two installments a 2,200-word interview with Jan Mano, a former officer of the National Security Corps [SNB] from Trencin, entitled "Contacts of the Nemsova Lawyer." The place and date of the interview, which was conducted by MLADA FRONTA DNES reporter Ivo Slavik and RESPEKT reporter Milan Zitny, are not given.

In the first installment of the MLADA FRONTA DNES interview, Mano reminisces about Vladimir Meciar as he knew him prior to the November 1989 revolution, when Meciar worked as company lawyer for the Sklobal plant in Nemsova near Trencin. Mano recalls that, prior to November 1989, he had seen Meciar "four or five times in the car of J.M., a former StB officer" from Trencin and that Meciar also used to visit the Tiso villa in Trencin, the StB's district headquarters. "I saw him there at least three times," Mano says. Mano therefore deems it "possible that Mr. Meciar was an StB collaborator."

According to Mano, Meciar also "used to work for Peter Martiska," a Public Security Corps [VB] officer in Trencin. Once, Meciar reportedly gave Martiska the tip to carry out an unannounced inspection of the Sklobal plant and Sklobal director Motola. Mano claims that, in return for these services, Martiska intervened to discontinue investigations of unspecified "property-related criminal activity" that Vladimir Meciar was supposed to have committed as a functionary of a swimming club. "When I and a colleague inquired about the situation with regard to the complaint against Meciar, we found out that Martiska had swept the whole thing under the rug," Mano recalls.

Jan Mano also claims that, prior to November 1989, Meciar "strenuously tried to have his membership of the Communist Party of Slovakia renewed." To achieve this objective, Meciar had reportedly contacted "various

functionaries of the Communist Party of Slovakia District Committee in Trencin." Mano says that "the clout of Meciar's supporters was such that, had it not been for November 1989, Vladimir Meciar would have been admitted into the party." Mano even claims to have heard that Meciar was to become the new director of Sklobal, as soon as his party membership was restored.

In the second installment of the MLADA FRONTA DNES interview, Mano discusses his indirect involvement with Vladimir Meciar after the November 1989 revolution. Mano says that, before Christmas 1989, he learned from Vladimir Krajci, the brother-in-law of Alexander Dubcek, that Vladimir Meciar had been proposed for the post of Slovak minister of interior. When he found this out, he continues, "I told myself that this was the end of the world." Mano reportedly sat down and wrote letters to President Vaclav Havel, Federal Assembly Chairman Alexander Dubcek, and Milan Cic, the then Slovak prime minister, in which he warned them against Meciar, saying that he considers him to be "neither suitable nor competent for that post."

In the bulk of the second installment of the interview, Mano then narrates the story of the repercussions of his letters. In January 1990, following Meciar's appointment as Slovak minister of interior, he says, the Slovak Ministry of Interior sent an inspection team to Trencin "to probe into everything." Mano recalls that he was "interrogated" about his letters and subsequently suspended from active duty. He notes that his telephone was being bugged and that the inspection team's general conduct reminded him of "the times when the Nazis came to Slovakia." In view of the "pressure" that had been brought to bear upon him, Mano eventually gave up the intention to appeal against his suspension and voluntarily resigned from his post.

Speaking about the Slovak Interior Ministry inspection team's activities in Trencin, Mano mentions that one night the team had entered the StB's headquarters in the city (the Tiso villa), ostensibly to prevent the destruction of files by the then chief of the SNB District Administration. Mano stresses that the team was not authorized to enter the villa because it was "territory of the Federal Ministry of Interior." He also challenges the official explanation given for the operation and suggests that the real aim was to cover up Vladimir Meciar's former collaboration with the StB. Mano says: "If the chief of the SNB District Administration really wanted to shred anything important, he would have had plenty of time to do it earlier and he would not have to go to the villa to do it. The official explanation was only a pretext. I knew right away that the inspectors were putting things in order in the villa. The evidence of [Meciar's] cooperation with the criminal police could be destroyed earlier but the Slovak Interior Ministry inspection team's entry into the villa only confirmed my suspicion that Meciar had been a collaborator of [StB officer] J.M.. Another thing corroborating this suspicion is that J.M. has been made

a high-ranking commander. All the others [not specified, possibly StB officers] had to go, only J.M. kept being promoted."

Prague RESPEKT in Czech No. 9 (2 to 8 March) devotes three items to "breaking the silence" about Vladimir Meciar's past. The three items are heralded by a banner headline on the periodical's cover, which asks: "Meciar—End of Career?"

The first of the three items is a 2,400-word Milan Zitny article entitled "The Background of the DOCTOR [as published] Case." The article examines the background of the Slovak Interior Ministry inspection team's operation in the StB headquarters in Trencin, which, as Zitny specifies, took place on 26 January 1990 at night.

Zitny opens the article by saying that his investigations were prompted by recent press allegations that Vladimir Meciar may be identical with a secret police agent, code-named "Doctor," who shadowed Alexander Dubcek prior to November 1989. To "decipher and uncover the roots of this scandal," Zitny says, he and MLADA FRONTA DNES reporter Ivo Slavik visited Trencin where Meciar had lived prior to the revolution.

Zitny goes on to review his and Slavik's conversation with former SNB officer Jan Mano, which was reproduced in full by MLADA FRONTA DNES. Speaking about the operation by the Slovak Interior Ministry's inspection team in the Tiso villa, Zitny says: "Whoever wanted to enter the StB building in Trencin in 1990 required the written consent of Richard Sacher, the then federal minister of interior. Yet the employees of the Slovak Ministry of Interior did not have any consent at that time. Nonetheless, they entered the building, seized a lot of material, and took it away, to Bratislava. In this way, the Slovak minister of interior unlawfully appropriated material that is subject to special handling [top secret] and that was the property of the Federal Ministry of Interior. Viewed from this perspective, it is possible to assess the entry into the villa and the removal of files as burglary and theft aimed at the acquisition of documents of a top secret nature. In the course of his career, Vladimir Meciar has repeatedly been asked how he gained access to information about StB collaborators and agents. He replied that he 'found it on his desk one morning.' Now that the Trencin night operation has become public knowledge, the mysterious being that is distributing agents' files is beginning to assume a concrete shape.

"For the time being, we do not know how the material from the Tiso villa was subsequently used. We do know, however, why someone should want to get hold of it. This material can be used as an effective instrument of pressure to push through one's will where political means have failed. Or the owner can destroy this material. The second option is highly likely when the owner finds in the material compromising evidence about himself. It is worth noting that such an 'abduction of documents'

occurred only at Trencin, that is, in the city where Vladimir Meciar used to live."

Zitny continues: "Vladimir Meciar frequently claims that the StB used to persecute him. Mr. Mano, but also former StB officers, claim that this was not the case. Several witnesses confirm that, prior to November [1989], he used to be seen, on numerous occasions, in the car of a certain StB steering officer. Jan Mano claims, moreover, that Vladimir Meciar figured in the SNB records as the VB's collaborator in matters of economic crime.

"It needs to be said, however, that the question of whether Vladimir Meciar was or was not an StB collaborator is not what really matters in this case. Far more important is the fact that, at the very beginning of his political career, Vladimir Meciar did not respect the law. Let us recapitulate: Burglary of a Federal Interior Ministry building, followed by the theft of material of a secret nature."

In the same issue, on pages 4 and 5, RESPEKT publishes a 2,600-word interview with Leonard Cimo, a Slovak Interior Ministry officer, by Milan Zitny entitled "The Files Were in Trencin." The place and date of the interview are not given. Cimo is identified as the officer in charge of the Slovak Interior Ministry inspection team's operation in the Tiso villa in January 1990. According to Zitny, Cimo is "one of the people who either participated in Vladimir Meciar's activity or who knew about it and who are now beginning to speak about this activity in public."

At the outset of the interview, Cimo reveals that Slovak Interior Minister Pittner has released him from his "oath of silence," which allows him to speak about the January 1990 operation. He then identifies Vladimir Meciar as the initiator of that operation. Cimo says: "Vladimir Meciar summoned me on 26 January 1990 between 2000 and 2100 and told me that he had just received a phone call from Lt. Jozef S. from the former StB in Trencin. The lieutenant said that material was being destroyed in the StB building there. The order was for me to go to Trencin with the inspection commission and to thwart this activity. The minister said, moreover, that Lt. S. had prepared some material for him. I was supposed to find it and take it to Bratislava."

Asked whether he "did not find it peculiar" that Meciar wanted him to fetch material belonging to the Federal Ministry of Interior, Cimo replies: "I was instructed not to put it into the protocol because Minister Sacher had supposedly been informed about the whole matter."

Speaking about the operation itself, Cimo says that he found the StB building sealed and that, according to the number on the seal, Lt. S. was the last person to have sealed the building. The interviewer wonders how this is possible, as the StB had been disbanded by that time and StB members' access to their former workplaces had been barred. Cimo replies that, in practice, it was not uncommon for former StB members to enter the

building; they only had to request the keys "on the ground that they still had some private things there."

Asked about the material that he picked up in Trencin, Cimo says that he found a "pile of material, about 0.5 m high" in a filing cabinet. This material consisted of "about 18 dossiers" containing files of reports from two categories of StB collaborators (informers and candidates of confidential collaboration) as well as summaries of agents' reports. The interview continues:

[Zitny] Do you remember any specific names?

[Cimo] No, I do not. We completed the whole operation at around 0300 [on 27 January]. At 0700 I handed over the parcel to Vladimir Meciar in his official villa in Partizanska Street in Bratislava where he lived then. On this occasion I reminded him that for the protocol of the whole operation I would need the federal interior minister's retroactive consent or, at the very least, a written statement that he approved of our course of action. Meciar asked me if it could wait until Monday.

[Zitny] Did you get it then?

[Cimo] No. About a week later I reminded him that I needed the statement. The minister told me not to worry because it is a political issue and everything had been agreed upon with [Federal Interior Minister] Sacher. But I never received any evidence of this.

Captain Cukan, Cimo's colleague who approached Meciar in the same matter, was reportedly given a similar reply: "When Cukan asked the minister for the statement of approval, Meciar told him that it was a trifle and that he need not worry about it." Cimo acknowledges that he did not pursue the matter any further and that this was a mistake. He justifies this by saying that he had "unconditional confidence in Meciar then, like most people."

Asked whether the inspection commission was asked to carry out a similar operation in any other district, Cimo says that, although the commission operated in the whole of Slovakia, "Trencin was the only place from which we fetched material."

Cimo goes on to discuss Minister Meciar's interference with the work of the Interior Ministry's inspection commission, which, as he says, made him lose his original confidence in Meciar. Cimo recalls that Meciar did not accept the conclusions of the inspectors' investigations into the activities of Jan Demikat, a former StB officer, and that some negative findings were omitted from the inspection commission's final report on Demikat. He also recalls that, even after becoming prime minister, Vladimir Meciar continued to interfere with the Interior Ministry's work: "[Meciar's successor] Minister Andras was carrying out personnel changes and was getting into collisions with Prime Minister Meciar. Ultimately, acting in contravention of the law, Meciar deprived Minister Andras of control over the ministry's security component. Not even the Slovak National

Council Presidium has this power. Under the law, it can only appoint or recall a government member but not deprive him of some of his powers, which is exactly what Meciar did."

In the remaining part of the interview, Cimo discusses the problems that he encountered at the ministry after March 1991 when he informed unidentified Slovak National Council deputies about "some serious facts" concerning developments at the Slovak Ministry of Interior under Vladimir Meciar: "At that time Minister Pittner stopped talking to me and in June 1991 he recalled me from my post without any reason." Cimo reportedly also discovered that his telephone was being tapped and that he, as well as his wife and daughter, were being shadowed. In the end he was transferred to what Zitny describes as an "insignificant post." When he requested the help of the General Prosecutor's Office and Prime Minister Carnogursky, "they did not even bother to respond," Cimo complains.

He concludes the interview by saying: "In the end they heard me out. But only about one issue—the villa in Trencin. Yet there are many more things that need to be investigated with regard to the activities of former Minister of Interior Vladimir Meciar, and from which conclusions must be drawn. Also for those who have been covering his activity to this day in the expectation that he will win the elections and will give them high-ranking positions, or will keep them in them."

In the same issue, on page 3, RESPEKT carries an 800-word Milan Zitny commentary entitled "The Future of Vladimir Meciar; The 'Doctor' Affair Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg." In the commentary, Zitny considers the political repercussions of the Meciar "affair," which, as the author believes, will probably influence the outcome of the elections.

Zitny says: "Basically, developments can evolve in two directions.

"The first scenario is that the suspicion of Meciar's conscious collaboration with the StB will be confirmed. In that case Slovakia's most popular politician would not be able to occupy any position of executive power for five years. It is likely that, in this case, he would start touring Slovakia very intensively and explain to the public that 'all that' is not true, that it is the federalists' conspiracy against him because he wanted to assert the Slovak nation's rights and give people work and bread. The former prime minister can rely in this respect on the help of some Slovak media, particularly radio, television, and the large dailies.

"Should developments take this course, it will evidently mean the radicalization of the street, demonstrations, and slogans about a quick solution or about the revolution 'only now starting in Slovakia.'

"A modification of the first scenario is the criminal prosecution of Vladimir Meciar on charges of abuse of the powers of a public official, regardless of whether he

was a conscious StB collaborator or not. Were such prosecution to take place, not only executive power would be at stake. In that event Vladimir Meciar would also be unable to run for any legislative body in the common state."

The second alternative, according to Zitny, is that the suspicion of StB collaboration will not be confirmed. In that case Zitny expects Meciar to "settle scores with his opponents and force them to go."

Zitny continues: "Confidential information obtained from sources that are close to Vladimir Meciar suggests that the two possible directions outlined above are realistic. According to this information, the HZDS chairman himself has described the situation as serious and has proposed a solution. Depending on which course his case will take, he will supposedly select a replacement for himself at the head of the party. The candidates are, supposedly, M. Knazko and M. Kovac. The intelligent and democratically minded R. Filkus evidently is not being counted on. This indirectly confirms that one reckons with the radical 'street' scenario.

"In the final count, however, other items could also play a role. For many HZDS politicians, Vladimir Meciar today signifies nothing but a person who endangers their careers and power ambitions. Some of them have therefore contacted Alexander Dubcek and, most likely, reckon with him for the vacated throne. Dubcek's restrained stand on the 'Doctor' affair is interesting in

this context. The Federal Assembly chairman claims that he did not know Meciar prior to 1990, while Vladimir Meciar claims the opposite. This discrepancy ought to be explained. It is an occasion to tell the Slovak voter the truth and to explain to him who is who."

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 5 March on page 2 carries two items devoted to the Meciar affair. The first is a 300-word CSTK report entitled "Secrets for the Unauthorized." The report quotes Richard Sacher, federal minister of interior at the time of the burglary of the StB headquarters in Trencin, as saying that he "did not know about the case and has learned about it only now," from the article in RESPEKT. The former minister added, however, that this was apparently not the only case of unauthorized persons having had access to secret material: "Many people from the security commissions of the former Civic Forum had access to StB offices," Sacher said.

The second item is a 200-word Trencin dispatch signed "sla." The report quotes Jan Mano, the SNB officer whom MLADA FRONTA DNES interviewed about Vladimir Meciar's pre-November 1989 contacts, as saying that on 3 March, the day when the second installment of the interview was published, he was visited by "editors from the HZDS weekly EXTRA S." Jan Mano reportedly told the MLADA FRONTA DNES correspondent that "the apparent motive of the visit was to extract from me a denial of the interview."

### Csurka's Address to MDF National Convention

92CH0323A Budapest MAGYAR FORUM  
in Hungarian 1 Jan 92 p 5

[Speech given by Istvan Csurka, vice president of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, at the party's fifth national convention, held in Budapest on 14-15 December 1991: "A Shortage of Resources"]

[Text] In order for a party to prepare a program that is acceptable by its own society, it must be clear in seeing, and in making others see, the state of the society in question. In addition to being mercilessly accurate, the statement of this condition must also be concise and articulate. Thus, I am going to try to set aside all caution and describe this condition in one single expression. The basic condition of today's Hungarian society and economy can be characterized by these words: A shortage of resources. This is shown by the fact that only a small percentage of people participate in public life, while most voters do not even take part in local elections, and it is unmistakably present in the economic fact that the size of the gross national product is decreasing each year, and Hungarian life can hardly use anything but this shrinking to cover the expenses of its survival. There is no money to start anew, and there are no resources for culture, social policy, or national self-defense. The listing is not complete. We have inherited this condition from the previous regime. The shortage of resources was created and left for us by the Kadar system and the subsequent deceptive reform communism; but we solve nothing by making this statement. The shortage of resources is a factual state that must be acknowledged, and subsequently everything possible must be done to change it.

The domestic shortage of resources is made up of two elements. Human resources are being exhausted. Under the Kadar regime's aegis, which was based on appearances and a Potemkin approach, broad strata of our society fatally exploited themselves, while spending rapidly dwindling time and energy on regenerating their own bodies and spirits. Ours is an ageing society: There is a steady decrease in the number of constructive generations and a growth in the proportion of dependents. Moreover, even the young among us do not begin their lives with militant assertiveness and a will to produce, but with an air of ineptness and vulnerability, expecting favors and patronage. There are few among us who are brave and enterprising.

The Kadar era squandered human creativity, which in 1956 wanted to bring about an independent, free Hungary. Undoubtedly, this was done at the prompting of foreigners, but guilty ones as well as their local satraps and beneficiaries alike must answer for their despicable deeds to the detriment of Hungarians.

Much has been said about how our economy has been sold off, destroyed, and driven into debt. We are also familiar with the situation that is generally referred to in simple terms as the collapse of the Soviet market. This

Soviet market came to be the supporting element of Hungary's political (and, willy-nilly, economic) system by the outflow of Hungarian energy and products to that "market" without repayment of equal value, because in exchange for this Soviet power maintained the regime in Hungary. However, there is an even more serious factor here, which is seldom mentioned. The uniquely irresponsible course of action in which previous managers of Hungarian economic and fiscal affairs tied the country's economy to the mercy of international monetary resources and loans, all the while allowing those expensive moneys to flow out of the country or using them in an irrational manner, also means that subsequent administrations and governments have practically no choice of action and maneuvering room. They must obey prescriptions coming from the central sources of credit, while they have no opportunity to recover the energies that were previously allowed to escape. It is almost as if it were calculated to ensure that the coming government had no other choice but to expose society to such self-torture and bring the economy to such a standstill that would inevitably result in complete disillusionment and rebellion.

After all, a society cannot long exist with a prolonged shortage of resources. Deprivation and lasting immobility leads to an accumulation of tensions, and may destroy everything in a final, usually anarchistic explosion. Thus, at the time of the next start there would be much fewer people for whom new resources would have to be created.

This, then, is the basic situation in which the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]-led coalition and government must govern, and the National Assembly must create laws. How people relate to this shortage of resources is what divides our society into two segments. There are those whose interest is to prolong this situation as long as possible, because it is from this situation they derive their authority, their wealth, their monopolistic positions, and their position in the structure of redistribution. On the other hand, there are those who would like to end this situation, because if they were to gain access to the resources, they could obtain economic opportunities, and thus sovereignty and freedom, and this sovereignty and freedom would also contribute to their political power.

Clearly, the government's efforts focus on creating resources and distribute them among as many participants as possible. The power of democratic government is in its ability to give. For obvious reasons, its followers will come from the ranks of those to whom it was able to provide a portion of life-sustaining energy. This is why the reform-communists gave up their posts with relative nonchalance; they knew better than anyone what they left behind: There is nothing to distribute. What there was, they have already distributed among themselves. We must face a cold fact, that of the insufficiency of external resources. Just at the time when we underwent our systemic change, the world, including Europe, found itself facing a distressing situation, and global economy

came under the shadow of a new recession, making external resources quite inaccessible. Hungary's new government could not start with an empty account; it could not appear on the international monetary market without acknowledging the debts incurred by the previous regime. Making a choice among several opportunities is only possible when one is not in an emergency situation. This government assumed power when the country was already in an emergency situation. Thus, we are forced to assume the burdens accumulated by the previous administrations, and we are compelled to operate within a narrowly defined course.

This is why our banking system cannot be managed by individuals who may be closely tied to those circles whose interest is in prolonging the shortage of resources as long as possible.

The shortage of resources also distorts the process of privatization, which is a fundamental consideration. In view of the fact that no live original capital appears on the market, privatization is implemented in an inconsistent manner by those who are privileged to have control of the process. The primary element of privatization at the present time is a process of reduction. Under the pretext of modernization, managers of enterprises that are targeted for privatization first shrink their firms, selecting out the profitable portions and transferring them to their names (paying disproportionately low prices that are hidden by the reduction), and leave the inoperative portions to the state, the fall guy. In many cases, unemployment is the result of such shortage-based privatization.

As revealed by an MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] document that was recently leaked, the leaders of the opposition are aware of this state of resource shortage. They should; after all, they are largely responsible for creating it. Their present political program consists of prolonging this condition as long as possible, thus creating as much dissatisfaction as possible among the masses that are burdened by the deteriorating living circumstances, and blaming the present government for all this. The recently revealed alliance between the MSZOSZ [National Organization of Hungarian Trade Unions] and the MSZP is based on the exploitation of this situation. Their goal is to delay (or, if possible, prevent) any governmental measure that is aimed at eliminating this situation, to create as severe a resource-shortage in this country as possible, and to retain as many of their own men as possible in positions of influence at various levels of practical power, just to be sure. Assisting them in achieving this goal are the press and mass media (both survived the transition unscathed, due to outrageous misrepresentation), primarily represented by the furtive communist center at the Radio which is allowed to continue undisturbed its disruptive activities and ruin public opinion under the leadership of Csaba Gombár. Joining in this disruptive work are members of the old guard hiding in the state administrative machinery, the legion of staffers remaining at the

various institutions who feign loyalty to the new government, and the dissatisfied intellectuals gathered around the opposition parties who cannot forget their defeat in the elections and insist on creating a counterculture. Parts of this struggle are the incitement of conflict between culture and consumer culture, that is, culture with national-populist roots and cosmopolitan trends, as well as the elimination of creative individuals and institutions that have native roots. Considerable resources from abroad are also available to accomplish these goals.

The Hungarian Democratic Forum must realize that this struggle for the systemic change is a genuine combat, to be waged without compromise.

We can make progress only by taking one step at a time.

Regardless of the difficulties involved, it appears that we have already won the battle surrounding the issue of compensations. The opposition could not prevent us from lifting ourselves out of the swamp of socialist ownership practices, and still offer a small compensation to those who are entitled to it. Here are at least 600,000 individuals who at last realize that our intentions are good, and we want to see them become free and independent proprietors of their own land holdings. In addition, the historical churches have also regained their lost real estate properties.

In effect, we are also at the end of the era of gullible naivete. Those taking a position beyond the dividing issue of shortage of resources, and covertly or overtly working in order to perpetuate this condition, may state and proclaim anything (even speak of democracy or liberalism), but they are not working for the best interests of the Hungarian people.

The positions taken on the issue of the [1994 Vienna-Budapest] World Exposition were of revealing significance.

The whole contemporary world finds itself in a very uncertain situation. No one can predict whether we can avoid a recession. Unexpected explosions may be forthcoming. The collapse of the Soviet Union holds extreme dangers. The Croats' present predicament illustrates what the weaker nations may expect. Our enemies and our opponents are aware of these facts. They consider our shortage of resources, and the resulting standstill of our country, as a net gain for themselves. This offers the only road through which they may be able to regain total political control.

The primary issue, therefore, is not who will win during the next elections, but whether we will be able, before those elections, to create a new order and a society made up of free and sovereign existences, in which it will make no difference which party wins elections, because the system will not change. To accomplish this, we must proceed step by step, distribute the small pieces of incoming capital among simple individuals and their new enterprises, make order for the process of privatization, and create new bases for Hungarian democracy by

introducing employee ownership and endowing workers with a real share of property. In this effort, we must not be distracted by hesitantly shuffling around the sandbox of consensus-seeking.

We injure or persecute no one, but this is the end of the era of gullible naivety. Before we answer the concocted charges of witch-hunts, we ask our accusers to show us a single former communist or major MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party]-brigand who emigrated from this country wailing that we have taken anything away from him. No, [nothing ever has been taken away] unjustly, without legal bases. However, a thorough examination of personal wealth cannot be avoided. And, of course, it is impermissible that wasteful individual spending and frequent self-initiated salary increases deprive the Hungarian people of significant sums.

Supervision must be demanded in all areas of life.

This does not conflict with any liberal principle, because there is no liberalism that also frees anyone from the rule of laws. At most, it is the neophyte liberalism of the communists that depicts such a thing.

It is now half-time. We cannot say that we are doing well. We are soaked with perspiration, and stars dance before our eyes because we have been kicked in the head so often.

But this time we are here to get our act together. Undoubtedly, there is a shortage of resources, but I have just now mentioned one resource we have. We are still here. We ourselves, and our faith, constitute a genuine resource. Difficult situations prompt us to special achievements. The history of Hungarians demonstrates that miracles and revival always followed the most difficult situations.

This will happen this time, too, my friends!

**1988 Antall Letter to Grosz Stirs Controversy**  
*92CH0317A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG*  
*in Hungarian 9 Jan 92 pp 10-11*

[Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's letter to Karoly Grosz, then general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, preceded by UJ MAGYARORSZAG introduction and commentary, excerpts from Grosz's speech, and the related anonymous cover letter: "Charges and Facts"]

[Excerpt] As we informed our readers yesterday, on Tuesday evening the press department of the Prime Minister's Office issued a statement in conjunction with the fact that reproduced copies of documents from the archives of the one-time MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] have been received recently by various editorial offices and public personalities, under a cover letter that was signed "Democrats Ambling Toward Europe" and that contained false accusations. Pursuant to Law No. 83 of 1991 enacted by the National

Assembly, the documents in question have become the property of the Hungarian state as of 28 December 1991. Prior to that date, they were in the possession of the MSZMP Institute of Political History. The reproduced material concerns the person of the prime minister, therefore we are publishing its original text below.

**UJ MAGYARORSZAG Commentary**

Reproduced copies of documents from the archives of the one-time MSZMP have been received recently by various editorial offices and public personalities, under a cover letter that was signed "Democrats Ambling Toward Europe" and that contained false accusations. (Pursuant to Law No. 83 of 1991 enacted by the National Assembly, the documents in question have become the property of the Hungarian state as of 28 December 1991. Prior to that date, they were in the possession of the MSZMP Institute of Political History.) The anonymous cover letter refers to a letter from Jozsef Antall, calling it the prime minister's profession of allegiance, and it also contains a number of false accusations which, naturally, are not true. The letter alleges, for instance, that Antall sent a damaging report informing on Agnes Godo, an historian with whom he was supposed to have attended a conference. Never in his life has Jozsef Antall attended a conference in the company of Lieutenant Colonel Agnes Godo, a senior staff member of the Institute of Military History, nor has he ever traveled with her to Warsaw; consequently, he could not have written a report informing on her. However, he did protest about the lecture Agnes Godo had given in Warsaw on 26 May 1975, under a program sponsored jointly by the Hungarian Cultural Institute and the Association of Polish Partisans. In it she had labeled as fascists the participants—including Jozsef Antall, Sr.—in efforts to save Poles during World War II. He objected to Agnes Godo's historical and political views also in a subsequent letter of protest.

The anonymous letter does not reveal of whom its writers wanted to make a French-Hungarian agent working for Section II of Department III. And the fact that they addressed Istvan Csurka, the writer and a deputy of the National Assembly, as "Brother" Csurka, using the form of address that had been customary among members of the Arrow-Cross Party (the equivalent of Comrade at the time), just goes to show what kind of people they are.

On 1 December 1988, Jozsef Antall wrote a letter to Karoly Grosz, then general secretary of the MSZMP, to protest against certain aspects of Grosz's notorious Sports Stadium speech. It will be worthwhile to recall selected excerpts from that speech, a part of which was an attack launched against the Independent Small-holders Party, including its role in 1956-57. Here we wish to note that in 1988, in the No. 6 issue of HISTORIA, Jozsef Antall, Arpad Goncz, and Vince Voross published one of the most important documents about 1956 on this topic, together with an introduction. At the time he sent his letter to Karoly Grosz, Jozsef Antall gave



a copy of it to Imre Pozsgay. Incidentally, many opposition politicians also knew about the letter. Having received no reply from Karoly Grosz, on 27 December 1988 Jozsef Antall wrote again to inquire about the letter's receipt. According to the answer to that inquiry, received on 27 January 1989, the letter had been lost. Therefore Jozsef Antall sent the letter again on 4 March 1989, and received a reply on 20 March.

The prime minister has handed over the entire letter for publication. In it he does not make any statement—including conformity to European good manners—that he would not uphold even today, and what is not an unequivocal protest against the threatenig speech delivered at the time, or does not contain the historical truth about the Independent Smallholders Party's 1956 role and the political situation in 1988, respectively. He felt it was necessary to write the letter also because the appropriate documents in the Independent Smallholders Party's defense could not be published. He wrote the letter in spite of not being a member of the Independent Smallholders Party that had reorganized itself on 18 November 1988. Instead, he was one of the charter members of the Hungarian Democratic Forum who had not rejoined the Independent Smallholders Party in 1988.

The prime minister declares that he stands by all his previous published and unpublished writings and official correspondence even today. What recognition and honors he has received since 1970—including membership of many foreign academies and scientific societies—have been granted him solely for his scientific and professional activity. Therefore he most definitely rejects suspicions and insinuations like the ones in the attached anonymous letter, which offends others as well. And he does not wish to comment on them, nor on the cynism of the MSZMP's reply.

#### **Excerpts From Grosz's Sports Stadium Speech on 29 November 1988**

"The outcome of the struggle depends entirely on us, for this has become a prime example of class struggle. It depends on whether we are able to regain our self-confidence, rally sensible people to our side and, if necessary, act with determination against the enemy, the counterrevolutionary forces. If we are able to do so, order and security will be maintained, we will overcome our economic difficulties, preserve our values, and build a new Hungarian socialism that will be more modern and effective. And if not, then there will be anarchy and chaos, and—let there be no illusions—white terror will dominate." "We have here also a practical question. The Smallholders Party has registered its formation. The National Peasant Party has done likewise." "We have to ask also the Smallholders Party: Where has it been and what has it been doing up to now? What did it do, say, in 1956? For the document has been preserved in which Janos Kadar, acting on behalf of the Hungarian Socialist Party, invited the leaders of the Smallholders Party and National Peasant Party at the time to join in healing the

wounds inflicted in 1956 and to take part in the consolidation. But they refused to cooperate. What happened to make them change their minds 32 years later? I think that there may well be many, very many parties here. Nevertheless, they will have to render an account of where they have been, what they have done, and what politics they have engaged in. They will have to render that account not to the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, but to the Hungarian people."

#### **The Anonymous Letter**

Dear Editor in Chief:

For your information and possible use, we are sending you herewith material pertaining to the profession of allegiance that Prime Minister Jozsef Antall had addressed to Karoly Grosz, the former general secretary of the MSZMP.

The letter that Jozsef Antall had sent to the competent leaders of the MSZMP in 1987 may be classified as a step of a similar nature. In it he informed damningly on historian Agnes Godo, with whom he had been in Poland to attend a conference, that she had become alienated from the principles of Marxism and socialism, and had expounded views departing from them (this document is in the archives).

Knowing of documents reflecting and preserving such views, one cannot help but raise the question as to what is morally the more reprehensible these days. The problem of dubious value regarding the agents of the so-called Section III within Department III, or the prime minister's clandestine fawning over the previous political system and his profession of allegiance to it? And it is by no means a moot question how one should judge the person whom Section II of Department III (in other words, not Section III of Department III) employed as a French-Hungarian double agent.

After this there can come only the mother of all questions: What else is Muhammed allowed to do, or what may only he do? Is democracy growing laurels only for the privileged? Are only some people allowed to be turncoats without suffering the consequences?

For his information, we have sent the above material also to "Brother" Csurka, so that he may add in due time also "green-colored" adjectives to his collection of bolshevik tricks.

Budapest, 1992

Respectfully yours,  
[Signed] Democrats Ambling Toward Europe

#### **Antall's Letter of Protest to Grosz About His Sports Stadium Speech**

1 December 1988

To General Secretary Karoly Grosz, MSZMP Central Committee, Budapest



Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Regarding your 29 November speech published in today's issue of NEPSZABADSAG, allow me to add a few comments to that part which deals with the multi-party system, the functioning of the Independent Smallholders Party in 1956-1957, and the raised range of questions in conjunction with cooperation. I am compelled to do so by the memory of those who have died, by everything I know of these matters, and by a sense of responsibility and political views that do not always permit one to keep silent or to employ passive methods, which would have been more convenient.

"Pigeonholing" is not so simple in politics either. For the sake of simplicity, however, I accept the classification in your mentioned speech. The definite place you assign between "dedicated Communists and extremist reactionaries" offers fairly wide scope, and even more complimentary is the respect with which you speak of those who are motivated in their actions by "dedicated patriotism" and whose every step is determined by service to the Hungarian people and nation.

After these preliminary remarks, allow me to introduce myself. The introduction might warrant consideration of the contents of my letter and perhaps lend some credence to my words. Mr. General Secretary, we both are about the same age, nearing 60. Obviously, the impressions and experience we have gained in the course of our respective lives to date differ in many respects. But we both have lived through the great historic reversals of fortune in this country and were able to perceive and sort out with intelligent minds the most significant events of the war.

Family background has been a determining factor in my case. My father, Dr. Jozsef Antall, Sr. (1896-1974), had been government commissioner of refugees during World War II, a prisoner of the Gestapo in 1944, a member of the Smallholders Party of long standing (from 1931 on), national director of that party, its deputy in parliament, a state secretary of the Provisional National Government, minister of reconstruction in the Tildy and Ferenc Nagy governments, president of the Hungarian Red Cross, etc. He had been awarded high Polish, French, British, and other decorations, and a street was named in Warsaw after him. (His biography is included in Volume III of *Magyar Eletrajzi Lexicon [Hungarian Biographic Encyclopedia]*.)

I was raised in a spirit whose natural elements were dedication to the nation, democracy, humaneness, and sensitivity for social issues. Public service and politics were likewise a part of our everyday life. Since my childhood and youth, I have had opportunity to meet and know politicians, public figures. Some of them well, others less closely. I will not list their names, but the ones I am able to mention offhand from among the Hungarians are Szinyei-Merse, Radocsay, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Ferenc Nagy, Bela Kovacs, Ferenc Farkas, Istvan Bibo,

Bela Varga, Zoltan Tildy, Imre Kovacs, Jozsef Mindszenty, Vilmos Bohm, Istvan Barankovics, Istvan B. Szabo, Istvan Varga, Jeno Racz, etc.

That, of course, is no special merit; just something given, stemming from the circumstances. But it serves to condition a person not to think in terms of stereotypes. My most moving impressions during the war include becoming acquainted also with escaped French, British and Soviet prisoners of war, in addition to Polish and Transylvanian refugees; being in the company of Italian soldiers serving under Badoglio; as well as meeting German officers and soldiers opposed to Hitler. In 1944, on the (Gestapo) warrant for my father's arrest, my name was included as the hostage who was to have been taken into custody in case he escaped. I lived through the arrow-cross reign as a member of an anti-Hitler (then called anti-German) family, and the no less moving entry of the Soviet troops. But I had opportunity to see Marshall Voroshilov, the chairman of the SZEB [Allied Control Commission], at close range.

Perhaps it is only natural that I always have been more sensitive to truth than the average person, and that has created considerable difficulties for me. On 1 November 1956, as a young secondary-school teacher, I was elected chairman of our revolutionary committee. That happened in my absence, while I was in the Parliament building with my father and other politicians. The reorganization of the Smallholders Party was in progress. Naturally, that meant many things. Countless interrogations by Soviets and Hungarians; my being barred from teaching after my detention; and subsequently my rehabilitation in 1962. I began to work with all my energy as an historian, not only in the professional literature but in organizing public collections as well. Besides receiving numerous foreign and domestic scientific honors, honorary memberships, etc., I was awarded the gold medal of the Order of Labor (in 1982) in recognition of my official activity, in positions ranging from scientific staff member to [institute] director general.

I think that—below the upper sphere of politics, at the infrastructural level—we are able to do useful work for the country even if our views differ on many fundamental issues. Thus, after the years of consolidation (the end of the period of retribution), during the years of that peculiar Hungarian compromise and tacit understanding, I devoted all my strength to construction, to deeds. Temperamentally I am unsuited for continuous rhetorical opposition and feel a natural need to create and build in some field, regardless of how limited it may be. I devoted that need to improving the Hungarian nation's image abroad, by organizing successful foreign conferences or preparing good publications.

Regrettably, the march and eventually the rush toward a crisis became increasingly evident, including the changes and dissension "in your own party," to use Dezso Keresztury's words. In a party based on ideology, the pragmatism seemed incomprehensible, the growing practicism with which the next generation sat on the

fence to such an extent, wary of any false step that might be to its disadvantage at the changing of the guard. The postponement of decisions and failure to provide clear answers to questions made themselves felt even at the lower levels; "stagnation" became dominant. This was not and is not simply a part of the economic issues. Therefore, Mr. General Secretary, allow me to speak frankly also about this after introducing myself, and before commenting on the mentioned passages in your speech.

Nobody can deny the economic and political results, the achievements of recent decades; especially not in comparison with the neighboring countries and after considering objectively the restrictions imposed by world politics and the policy of alliance. That is something history will have to evaluate. But an analysis of the crisis that has arisen is not without its human and political lessons. How quickly the long-lived patriarchal popularity, the joviality of addressing Kadar as Uncle John, ended and vanished amidst the worsening economic conditions and the intellectual and political dissension. In my opinion, it is not possible to pursue sound policies without real moral and ideological principles, because that destroys the backbones of individuals; and the delusive effect of slight and relative "prosperity" lasts only until the next difficulty.

Perhaps you will find it strange to hear from me what I am about to say. But the absence of the labor movement's traditions, the disappearance of labor leaders trained by the Social Democrats, made possible the harmful tendencies of recent years. Our first generation of blue-collar workers—they constitute a majority—are former peasants who abandoned agriculture and former members of the lower middle class. In place of labor solidarity and class consciousness, their response to diminishing pay was to make ends meet by putting in more overtime. These are peasant reflexes, rather than blue-collar reflexes. It was possible to put them to good use during the Kadar era; they produced seeming tranquility, and its effect is still being felt. This is a significant difference in contrast with Polish society where, in addition to real peasants, continually trained blue-collar workers, the sons of blue-collar families, form a vast majority. But where did this lead in our country? With the disappearance of relative "prosperity," the popularity suddenly vanished. The people practically "wrote off" the previous leadership.

And now, Mr. General Secretary, I am coming to your speech of yesterday. I do not think that your choice of words and tone was very apt when you spoke with caustic irony about the Smallholders and the Peasant Party "registering their arrival." I do not wish to speak on behalf of the Smallholders Party that has just announced its activity; I am not authorized to speak for it, and I have distanced myself from it because of my reservations in some respects. (But that does not belong here; it is an entirely separate matter that perhaps may be clarified at a later date.) I am speaking out not on a sudden impulse, but because of my knowledge and

experience of the facts. You as General Secretary are not obliged to know these facts. After all, a politician must rely on information that is not necessarily complete.

In your speech you ask: "Where has it been and what has it been doing up to now? What did it do, say, in 1956? For the document has been preserved in which Janos Kadar, acting on behalf of the Hungarian Socialist Party, invited the leaders of the Smallholders Party and National Peasant Party at the time to join in healing the wounds inflicted in 1956, and to take part in the consolidation. But they refused to cooperate. What happened to make them change their minds 32 years later?" At this point you mention also the obligation to render an account to the Hungarian people. I understand the characteristics of a political speech as a genre, the earmarks of oratory at a party meeting, and do not wish to confuse them with the requirements of historical analysis. But what is not true historically will usually not prove useful politically either.

With reference to a few of the milestones along my life's path, and having witnessed these events directly at close hand, I am able to affirm that they cannot be interpreted this way, because the interpretation does not agree with the historical facts. I will dwell only briefly on the question of the Smallholders Party's "legal status" that has now arisen. Before the elections in 1949—after the cessation of the opposition parties—all political parties "gained admission" to the Popular Front. The important ones among them were the Smallholders Party and the Peasant Party. Only their respective (pro forma) "national headquarters" were left, with slimmed-down, perfunctory leaderships. That is how the nameplate of the Smallholders Party remained displayed, until 1 January 1960, at the entrance to the building that is now the Japanese Embassy (and that is also how the Smallholders Party was listed in the telephone directory). It neither dissolved itself nor was dissolved "legally."

Under a political system that declares a one-party system and does not tolerate the meaningful functioning of other political parties, of course, this is primarily a political question, rather than the subject matter of a legal opinion. Or more accurately, if the political will so decides, it accepts the legal, formal fact. That is what happened on 29 October 1956, when the reorganization of the Smallholders Party was announced, on the initiative of the MDP [Hungarian Workers Party] and the Imre Nagy government. By organizing parties, they had hoped to bring the crisis under control and to direct it into a suitable channel. But Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs were included in the government already then. That decision, therefore, is a matter of interpretation. But the justice minister's statement has been based on false information regarding the party's dissolution.

In your speech, Mr. General Secretary, you refer to the events that followed after 4 November 1956, to the rejection of the offer to cooperate. Therefore I will not dwell on the events that took place between 30 October and 4 November, when I myself was in the Parliament

building on several occasions. Bela Kovacs moved in with us on 5 or 6 November. He was an old friend of my father's. He had last visited us in 1947, and one of the first calls he made upon his return led to us. Bela Kovacs went from our home for talks on two occasions, at Janos Kadar's invitation. Both times my father accompanied him at his specific request, and waited for him in Istvan Dobi's office. At the same time, as several domestic and foreign memoirs have mentioned, the leadership of the Smallholders Party was "functioning" in our home (because of Bela Kovacs, among other reasons). But Istvan Bibó, Ferenc Farkas, József Fischer, and many other people from other parties also came there for talks.

I, too, was able to be present at many of those talks. I undertook drafting assignments at Bela Kovacs's request, and also delivered messages between him and Zoltan Tildy as well as other politicians, including Ferenc Farkas, Istvan Bibó, etc. Istvan Varga and Jenő Rácz also came there. Bela Kovacs had given them special negotiating assignments, also on questions of economic policy, among other things (with Kossá and István Friss). Furthermore, they—joined later by József Bogár—also took part in economic-policy planning that eventually became a part of the foundation for the policy of economic reform. Even when I was not present at the talks within the Smallholders Party and between it and other parties, I learned about them at first hand, directly from Bela Kovacs or my father. I had especially many opportunities to talk with Ferenc Farkas and Istvan Bibó.

I am able to affirm that Bela Kovacs, Zoltan Tildy, and also the other parties' representatives would have been willing to cooperate. Naturally, they had conditions and wanted guarantees. There are drafts and notes to prove what their standpoints were. With exceptional restraint, having lived through and been destroyed by clever salami tactics, they wanted to avoid the limitation of their usefulness to bringing the crisis under control and promoting consolidation. And it is also natural that they demanded amnesty for those who had been arrested, as well as for the negotiators who had been taken into custody during negotiations. They accepted the principle of democratic socialism, the democratic and socialist achievements of the past period, etc. For cooperation they wanted a political model that was morally acceptable and not in conflict with their entire world outlook. They tailored these demands to a deal, a compromise under the worsening conditions, going as far as they possibly could before pulling back.

After Bela Kovacs's talks in November, Janos Kadar advised him to return to Pécs (Patacs), which was interpreted unambiguously as postponement of the possibility of cooperation. The inclusion of the parties in the coalition as approximately equals remained questionable all along. The MSZMP was pressing for the parties to join separately, with selected individuals. Also later, with appropriate procrastination, things—including practical talks and statements—continued like this until the beginning of 1957. (Despite the fact Janos Kadar's

statement of 15 November mentioned a multiparty system.) Here close cooperation developed between the two agrarian parties.

What is essential at this point, in my opinion, is not so much the substantive issues or even the real and the tactical considerations on the part of the MSZMP, but mainly the foreign and domestic political situation in which Janos Kadar had to negotiate and govern at that time. In other words, the question of how much political freedom of movement he had. That too was clearly understood by Bela Kovacs and his associates, and they said so repeatedly. For that very reason, the simplifying formulation one finds in your speech can hardly be close to a real assessment.

The Romanian and Czechoslovak party and government circles unequivocally opposed early ideas of reform, the possibility of an opening and compromise. A fierce struggle was being waged at that time within the Soviet leadership, between the conservatives (Molotov, etc.) and the Khrushchev-Mikoyan line; it came to a showdown in late spring of 1957. Linked to that struggle, similar phenomena were occurring also in Hungary: a "leftist" (Dógi, etc.) plot was organized against Janos Kadar. Marshall Zhukov saved Khrushchev, but then the former too was removed (on charges of Pan-Slavism and Bonapartism). During our interrogations, we heard derogatory statements about Janos Kadar that far exceeded the other side's opinion.

Therefore it is obvious that the struggle within the Soviet leadership, the party leaderships in the neighboring people's democracies, and the domestic base did not leave much freedom of movement in the direction of reforms. Janos Kadar was able to rely on those who were willing to support party and government policies that were in line with the policies the Soviet Union was pursuing at the time, where—over and above the policy documents—also Stalinist (or neo-Stalinist) ambitions were being pursued. That applies to the Stalinist, pro-Rákosi officials as well as to certain individuals who volunteered to serve in the police detachments. But I have not mentioned as yet China's policy at the time, Zhou Enlai's European trip at the beginning of 1957, the subsequent worsening of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, and the domestic effects of all this.

Janos Kadar engaged in politics under very difficult conditions, in which his statement at the time of Khrushchev's downfall struck an independent tone and gained him recognition. In these circumstances, not even in a political speech may the question be simplified in this form: They did not want to cooperate, and where were they during recent decades? Also from among the members of these parties, very many were in prison and in concentration camp. And although they can be explained historically, the changes of earlier standpoints (the foreign deportation of Imre Nagy and his circle, the arrests and executions, etc.), the modifications could hardly have made cooperation possible from an ideological and

moral viewpoint. Especially when the question of cooperation arose only in subordination to the MSZMP's leading role, and even then mostly outside the framework of parties. This is not altered by the fact that Janos Kadar and his associates evidently had also anti-Stalinist reform policies in mind; indeed, there were fairly many contradictions during the months of change even in the matter of sentencing. Perhaps they had not imagined things exactly the way they turned out.

The dilemmas that are felt even today—under the much more favorable conditions of Gorbachev's reform policies—arose as serious questions also then. A multiparty system's seemingly unbridgeable gap was the widest on the question of elections in which the parties were to compete. In the countries of existing socialism, there is as yet no historical precedent of a ruling communist party's willingness to accept the risk of a possible electoral and political defeat that would force it to relinquish power; in other words, willingness to accept an electoral system that is a multiparty system's very essence. For that very reason there is some truth in the views of those who believe it is much more honest to declare a one-party political system, than to have a fake multiparty system which allows the pro forma functioning of political parties. Like the fake multiparty system introduced in our country in 1949, and the still existing fake multiparty systems in several other people's democracies (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic). As a permanent form, the Popular Front system based on predetermined proportions could hardly win the stamp of moral legitimacy. Does this remain the big question?! Every search for a possible solution came to a dead end here.

I will not deny that I favor parliamentary democracy based on a multiparty system, which I regard as the only guarantee against dictatorship (according to the well-known formula: nothing better has been invented as yet). How strange it is to regard this as instant "bourgeois restoration." In my opinion, a socialist must firmly believe that the people want to maintain the socialist achievements and would not let them be dismantled. If socialists do not believe this, then the only thing left to do is to serve the public good determined from above. And this, even with the best of intentions, cannot be considered anything other than a modern version of enlightened absolutism. I think that the past is a very heavy burden for existing socialism's model: its ideology is based on revolutionary, democratic and socialist traditions that presuppose forces governing by the majority's will and opposed to dictatorial methods. At the same time, after coming to power, a dedicated and conscious minority—retaining the traditions and ideology—assumes the responsibilities of government, which leads to contradictions. That is a very great disadvantage in comparison with other political systems which disapprove of liberal political democracy, purposefully accept the rule of the prince or "elite," etc. and openly disparage democracy. That is a very great contradiction which cannot be bridged easily, not even when one concedes the best intentions.

To all this, of course, one must add the given country's or region's foreign- and military-policy position and freedom of movement. Systems of alliances are parts of the evolved political and social models—their basic criteria so to say, in the interest of homogeneity. Actually, also the foundation of the real national consensus, of the historical compromise, must be sought here and perceived as a function of the system of alliances, the independent variable. Although outbursts, the rhetorical disparaging of the "other side," are quite natural also in politics, they have no reason to be in conflict with the historical facts or basic requirements of political ethics. Where were these parties and why have they changed their minds now? I do not have accurate information about the present registration of the listed parties and the makeup of their membership. My familiarity is limited merely to the political initiative that organized itself as the Smallholders Party. It became impossible for that party to function. Most of its leaders died or grew too old. The organization itself was allowed no scope. And earlier, the arrests had ended also its prospects.

They have not "changed their minds." Instead, amidst the existing model's crisis and reform, also the traditions and ideas surfaced that are upheld by political formations which were defeated by dishonest means in the unfair competition. There can be no doubt that the social changes which have taken place in the country, the structural transformations, and the European forms of political parties do not favor a revival of the Smallholders Party in its old framework. But it embodies a political tradition, the model of a political system that history has proven alongside the Marxian historical vision. Despite its many political mistakes and ill-advised attitudes, a great virtue of the Smallholders Party is that, even when the parliamentary system was being disparaged and in the period of various corporative concepts, it remained consistently faithful to its social commitment and its concept of a liberal rule-of-law state; although it was not easy to do so in the 1930's and during the war. I do not think that it is warranted at present to paint before the public the scepter of "white terror." It would be very sad if there were a breeding ground for it in Hungary, and especially if it were to prove strong. In the same manner, also the "leftist" Stalinists are merely an insignificant minority, held together by their self-interest. In my opinion, they too could jeopardize the MSZMP's reform-policy efforts only under the influence of external factors, and hopefully we do not have to give that much chance of happening. A struggle against phantoms is not a real basis for government policy.

Although I have not written this letter to provide an analysis of the domestic political situation, here and there I have been referring to it as well, because of the interrelations. We can make headway by properly interpreting pluralism; with a program that calls for a rule-of-law state and a social market economy; by clarifying the ideological principles; by coordinating the rhetoric intended for domestic and foreign consumption respectively; and by retaining the democratic and socialist

achievements that the Hungarian people have undertaken and accepted. There are many well-intentioned people in this country who are not thinking in terms of specters and illusions; instead, they are seeking a way out based on a frank assessment of the situation. It is easy to present in an unfavorable light also the various independent political circles, the so-called dissident or alternative groups. But the reverse of what Benedetto Croce once said ("every capitalism gets the communism it deserves") is also true. The "opposition" is always the mirror image of the power elite, of the same unfavorable conditions, the product and carrier of the diseases that take effect when there is an imbalance relative to the power structure.

I do not think that the animation of our political life or even its wild offshoots are the main problem. They cannot pose a real threat to a state and government organized on the basis of power, with every means at their disposal. The main problem is the country's general weariness, skepticism (about everything), and depression. A depressed country and people are incapable of creating great things, or even of extricating themselves from their trouble. We need movement, public audacity, faith and credibility, namely the credibility of power and of politics in general. The energy-wasting physical exercise of "contract and relax" does not lead anywhere, and a public consensus cannot be achieved on its basis. The earlier imaginary public consensus was actually a consensus based on an active generation's disappointment, but that could not last forever and prove infinitely useful.

There definitely is a need for the MSZMP's internal clarification, for the creative and political strength of its members, without which there can be no successful renewal. That is one of the basic requirements for a policy of domestic reform. But it is likewise necessary that MSZMP members abandon their illusion of knowing everything best and cease equating the peak of an individual's development with his complete and unconditional acceptance of communist political ideology. They have no reason to do so, and it never leads to a realistic political outlook or even to realistic human behavior. It is wrong to strive to discredit one another. What we need is that all those who put the Hungarian nation's fate above everything else do everything possible to achieve a balance of power under which our position in the world will be able to improve, with due consideration for all the prospects that the coming years might bring. Let us have, at home and abroad, an image that lends us political, economic and moral credibility. A policy proclaimed and pursued without ulterior motives and deceit will gain staunch allies for your party and will make feasible a historical compromise, a political mutual understanding that is based on national common sense.

Mr. General Secretary, I am nearing the end of my lengthy and frank letter. After statements stemming from the general political thinking, therefore, allow me to

revert to the part of your speech that dwells on the Smallholders Party, and to sum up my reactions to it as follows:

- In a practical political compromise at the time of the 1956-57 attempt at cooperation, within and even beyond its own ideological limits and together with the Peasant (Petofi) Party, the Smallholders Party was willing to accept the possibility of a coalition;
- Naturally, sharing the responsibilities of government could be imagined only with conditions and guarantees, but these were not given. Actually, there were never any meaningful offers made, at least not ones that would have retained the parties' framework. (Although Janos Kadar did speak on 15 November in favor of a multiparty system.) Without guarantees and power sharing, the invitation to join a coalition could be interpreted only as a tactical move, in the interest of consolidation. The parties were unable to accept the invitation without becoming morally bankrupt;
- The schematic interpretation of the preceding, as presented [in your speech], is unfair. After all, the series of obstacles which arose at the time within the Soviet leadership and in the party leaderships of the other socialist countries involved questions of foreign and military policy that far exceeded the Smallholders Party and other parties. There were also the questions of China, Yugoslavia, etc. All this, together with his domestic support, limited to a large extent also Janos Kadar's aspirations;
- The concepts of a policy of reform date back to that time, and the experts of other parties also took part in their elaboration. But these concepts were able to emerge only much later and after yet another failure, causing no small delay for the country. Only a comprehensive analysis could reveal the truth, but that would require statements from many more people;
- This view is strange also because how could it then be possible to justify the political retribution, the series of arrests, sentences, and detentions without trial, against politicians of the Smallholders Party and other parties, merely because they had turned down the invitation to cooperate, if it was ever meant seriously;
- It would be more appropriate to admit that the MSZMP and the government were not in a position which would have made possible the acceptance of cooperation with guarantees, under the conditions set forth in speeches, and that they were not even prepared then for such cooperation, after the events that had taken place. Therefore cooperation at the time has been omitted from the history of Hungarian politics.

In my opinion, when removing the blank spots of history, we must sketch in the real picture, instead of adding more blank spots or providing false data just to cover the spots. If we do this in accordance with reality, then the question of where the parties have been up to now does not even arise. If we consider the antecedents in their

entireness, raising this question is not warranted, not even for rhetorical effect. Without wishing to attribute any special merits to a national party that once received 57 percent of the vote, I will nevertheless quote a passage from the outline of its 1946 program, because it sounds timely even in the light of today's rhetoric: "All violence, tyranny and deception must be excluded from the administration of public affairs, and the great concerns of the nation must be settled by general agreement."

I apologize for my lengthy letter, but perhaps it has not been written in vain. Please accept my best wishes for your difficult task.

Sincerely yours, [signed] Dr. Jozsef Antall

### 1992 Monetary Policy Alternatives Discussed

92CH0360F Budapest TOZSDE KURIR in Hungarian  
16 Jan 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Hungarian National Bank Vice President Sandor Czirjak by Karoly Bognar; place and date not given: "Stop, Go; Monetary Policy '92"—first paragraph is TOZSDE KURIR introduction]

[Text] Monetary policy was the "success branch" last year. Its most spectacular results: the establishment of an external financial balance, the bridling of inflation, and the replenishment of foreign exchange reserves. Success usually triggers certain disapproval by the less successful. In this case the disapproval sounded as follows: Monetary policy has run a course separate from the real economy. When we asked Sandor Czirjak—by now vice president of the central bank—about the latitude available to, and the goals of, monetary policy, we also asked him to react to this statement.

[Bognar] Monetary policies constitute a process. For this reason the monetary concept for 1992 cannot be examined separately, in the abstract from the previous year's monetary events. Accordingly, what accomplishments, or for that matter, fiascos define the latitude of monetary policy this year?

[Czirjak] As so many other things, monetary policy has also reached a turning point. The turning point consists of the following elements: the favorable external balance position of the past two years, and the level of reserves that is acceptable even on an international scale. As a result of all these factors, the pressure exerted upon monetary policy from the outside seems to be lessening. To express myself in terms of a graphic description: insofar as our external balance situation is concerned, we have climbed out of the pit and we are walking on a level field. The good results may be credited in part to the strong influx of foreign capital. We no longer will have to strive to achieve a surplus in the current balance of payments at any price if this trend remains unchanged. This is one of the factors that determines our latitude today.

The other factor that also creates a new situation from the standpoint of monetary policy is the increase in the proportion of individual savings, which exceeds any increase that has ever been seen before. This also determined our latitude to a certain extent last year. Here, too, there are some uncertain factors of course, and I truly hope that the favorable trend also continues this year.

The third factor that also creates a truly new situation from the standpoint of public order is the fact that a significant proportion of the means by which liquidity could be managed has "expired." From a practical standpoint, from among the refinancing opportunities the only one that remains available is short-term export prefinancing because the combined total amount of treasury certificates that may be purchased in the framework of auctions and the volume of money available for discounting notes is negligible as compared to the main balance of the banking system.

The anticipated reduction in inflation also presents new tasks to monetary policy, and it does so not only at the macroeconomic level, but also in terms of microeconomics.

As a result of the aforementioned factors the monetary practice followed thus far is going to change this year. While up to now we vigilantly watched the moment when surplus liquidity appears in the system so that we could "grab hold of that" immediately, beginning in January 1992 the MNB is going to pursue a far more complex and more risky monetary policy. We will permit a relatively high level of liquidity to enter the system, and we are going to observe with watchful eyes the ensuing events. Two consequences are possible. One of these is a situation in which the transmission function performed by commercial banks works well (i.e., they lend money not to plug holes created earlier, but provide credit in a considered manner to finance promising investments) and in which the entrepreneurial sphere also undertakes only well-founded development projects. At this point a mild liquidity and excess credit would appear in the system and interest rates would slowly begin drop. As a result of this, accumulation would begin to increase and the balance of payments would deteriorate somewhat. But this would cause no problem if operating capital flowed to the country at an appropriate pace. Accordingly, if this "scenario" became a reality, a moderate growth could begin in the real economy.

The other consequence would be as follows: Banks would finance loss operations with the excess money in the system, an excess purchasing power would evolve, and inflation would increase.

Accordingly, we will formulate monetary policy depending on which outcome materializes. I could characterize this situation by saying that this year we would be experimenting with both tightening and loosening the belt.

[Bognar] This system presumes the rapid, reliable flow of information, and the existence of a statistical system that is far more modern and developed than today's system. This subject is barely dealt with these days.

[Czirjak] Indeed, the lack of an adequate information system could be the vulnerable point of this year's monetary policy. But the central bank is doing everything it can in part to modernize its own information network, and in part by struggling to establish the missing institutions in order to avert this technical obstacle.

[Bognar] What other dangers lurk around monetary policy in 1992?

[Czirjak] From the standpoint of price increases: the inflationary expectations and the unwarranted outflow of income. A change in the position of the budget may cause problems, regardless of whether such change involves excess spending or the failure to realize revenues. As a result of events taking place around our country it is conceivable that foreign capital is going to flow at an unpredicted pace to Hungary. At this point the securing of the external balance would once again become the primary goal. Hurrah optimism ("The seven lean years are over!") might dominate us, and this could raise questions about the necessary monetary rigor. It is also possible that individuals will save money in unexpected proportions, etc. The role played by open market transactions must also be increased because we must be more flexible than before in adapting ourselves to the processes.

But the real threat would be strong pressure exerted by society upon the banks as a result of downscaling, and

increasing unemployment, and this, together with the already existing fears could weaken monetary policy.

[Bognar] In the wake of last year's successful monetary policy one could immediately hear the charge: the fiscal sphere has removed itself from the real economy.

[Czirjak] This statement is simply not true. It reminds me of similar statements made in the 1970's. In those days they claimed that everything was all right in the real sphere, that enterprises were functioning perfectly well, the only thing they were unable to do was to sell their products. Thus the concerns that developed about liquidity and the fiscal sphere were held responsible for this. This is a typical case of confused processes and concepts. Fiscal processes always reflect real processes. Financial concerns arise relative to production and sales problems. This is an entirely different matter. What we are dealing with is that financial processes have the character of indicators which quickly surface concerns in the real economy. It is true that improving the external balance—which is a long-term criterion for a functioning economy—came about as a result of a large-scale restructuring of internal processes, and by virtue of the regrouping of significant amounts of income. Everything would be all right from the standpoint of real processes had we financed deficit production, but the country would have become insolvent. Accordingly, we are not dealing with a situation in which fiscal and monetary policy followed separate paths; instead we are witnessing a forceful shock effect upon the real economy caused by the evolution of macroeconomic balances, and these brought to the surface certain anomalies that had been covered up by the previous system. Accordingly, nothing was severed from anything; the only thing that has occurred is that something has become visible that was not visible before.



**Spiroiu Comments on Domestic, Foreign Issues**  
*AU0603120392 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER*  
*in Romanian 3 Mar 92 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Defense Minister Nicolae Spiroiu by Aristotel Bunescu; place and date not given: "The Army Is Not a Scarecrow"]

[Text] [Bunescu] During a recent broadcast of the SOTI television station, Mr. Mircea Druc referred to the upcoming signing of an economic treaty between the territories on the two banks of the Prut River by emphasizing security issues and mutual assistance in case territorial sovereignty and integrity are violated. What is your comment on this affirmation?

[Spiroiu] I have no knowledge of such an accord. Of course, this does not lie within the competence of the Ministry of National Defense, and it so happens that I did not listen to Mr. Druc's statement. This aspect belongs to the realm of relations between the two states. As far as I know, at this point and following the meetings in Minsk and Alma Ata, the Republic of Moldova is part of the Commonwealth of Independent States that formerly formed the Soviet Union and are now setting up their own armies. The minister of national defense has also been appointed in the person of Lt. Gen. Ion Costas. At this time, they are trying to set up an army and a Ministry of National Defense. This is a process that depends on discussions with the Command in Moscow and with the Commander of the United Armed Forces Marshal Shaposhnikov and his assistants. Depending on how these states—so to speak—are going to develop, the treaties that will be concluded between our two countries will probably also include activities of the two armies.

[Bunescu] A question in connection with the war in the Gulf. This conflict led to clear conclusions regarding strategy, military operations, and tactics. Proceeding from these conclusions, in which direction will the modernization of the Romanian Army proceed?

[Spiroiu] Of course, we cannot equal the way in which the conflict in the Gulf developed—when bearing in mind the large amount and sophisticated technology that was used there, such as on shooting grounds, if you will (the military equipment from countries possessing top technologies was united there)—to a certain military conflict that could, let us say, take place in our geographic area. We hope that, on the basis of the CSCE process, such a conflict will be prevented. Thus, we cannot estimate the modernization process of the Romanian Army based on what happened in the Gulf. That would be very costly. Thus, the modernization process of the Romanian Army, especially when it comes to equipment, has to bear in mind the technological equipment level of our neighbors and the possibilities our national economy has at this time, as well as the training standard of those who use this technology. This is why we have to bear in mind a great number of factors when we have to decide on the characteristics of the technology we should have. However, what I want to say is that, for the time

being, the main problems are the budget appropriations, the funds, and not the modernization concept. This is very clear.

[Bunescu] A question in connection with the recent visit NATO Secretary General Mr. Manfred Woerner paid to Bucharest: Given the security void due to the collapse of former structures—I am talking of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union—did you note during your bilateral talks a commitment within the NATO alliance along the line of getting involved in Romania's defense, or along the line of mediation in a possible and obviously undesired conflict in which Romania may be entangled?

[Spiroiu] No. I do not remember such a thing. As a matter of fact, NATO proposes to diversify its activity in conformity with the CSCE process. One of the objectives it proposes, one of the commitments of Mr. Woerner, which was expressed as early as last summer during his first visit to Romania, a commitment which, I could say, he has honored with mathematical precision, was the one to do everything to lessen the feeling of insecurity in this part of Europe, in Central and in East Europe. Especially in the states of East Europe—I am thinking of Romania and Bulgaria—there is a feeling of insecurity because of the impression of a preferential treatment by the West, a treatment that discriminates between the countries that belonged to the Warsaw Pact, that is, the countries in the east of the continent on the one hand, and the countries in the center of Europe on the other hand. However, since last summer NATO has done a great deal to lessen this discrimination, and Mr. Woerner has done nothing but promise that he will continue to act in that direction, so that the countries in this area of Europe may enjoy equal treatment and so that—on this basis—the feeling of insecurity will decrease.

[Bunescu] Mr. Minister, what can you tell us about the import and export of weapons and military equipment?

[Spiroiu] Romania has developed a defense industry that is required for equipping the Army, an industry which in 1989 and, generally speaking, after 1982 used to ensure more than 95 percent of all kinds of military equipment. At one point we had a surplus, and Romania exported military equipment by each time observing, however, the embargoes imposed by international bodies. At this time, given the economic recession, the weapons industrial production is going through a serious recession. Consequently, our exports of military equipment is rather symbolic; we observe absolutely all areas falling within an embargo, including Yugoslavia where, despite all... well, commentaries and despite all affirmations, which proved to be ill intended and false. As far as imports are concerned, it was, of course, limited by our financial possibilities.

[Bunescu] What is the situation of the National Guard?

[Spiroiu] The National Guard continues to exist. It has gone through an instruction process. Its commands, which were under the command of the party bodies during the former regime, joined the military commands



immediately after the revolution; the command and the central chief of staff belong to the Ministry of National Defense. At this time, the National Guard is going through a reorganization process in the sense that its number is being reduced and that it is more thoroughly instructed.

[Bunescu] Mr. Minister, I want to thank you very much for this interview. In conclusion, would you like to convey something to the readers of *TINERETUL LIBER*?

[Spiroiu] What could I tell young people? To trust the Army and to do their military service when their time comes. To join the Army with confidence; training takes place with modern equipment and technology and by modern methods. The Army is not a scarecrow, it is a way to complete one's education through physical and psychological strengthening, especially since of late—from a psychological point of view—young people are quite fragile. Thus, they should come with confidence to do their military service. We are waiting for them, and we assure them that they will feel good in the Army, which does not dabble in politics, but focuses only on the national defense policy. In the Army, voting is free and correct as, in fact, has been noted, and commanders are well-trained people with higher studies. Military officers academies, which are special schools, now last for four years. Many of the commanders are close to their age group. Therefore, I want them to trust the Army and to come of their own accord to be trained to be part of this Army, if need be.

#### Article Views Mircea Druc Reunification Strategy

AU0503093792 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA  
in Romanian 28 Feb 92 pp 1, 8

[Article by Mihail Mihailescu: "Mircea Druc and the Strategy for Romania's Reunification"]

[Text] When Bessarabia, under the name of the Republic of Moldova, declared its independence, we were glad. Bessarabia was still part of the Soviet Empire. Then the Moscow putsch happened and Moldova actually obtained its independence. The leaders of Romania officially recognized the Republic of Moldova. Most people were no longer glad and did not agree with this. The putsch had created conditions for Romania's reunification. However, Ion Iliescu and company were flirting with the Romanian-Soviet Treaty.

Now the Soviet Union no longer exists. Nothing would have hampered the reunification of the nation. But, amazingly the communists here headed by Ion Iliescu and the communists across the Prut with Mircea Snegur at the helm oppose it. Will we possibly ruin this moment which is offered to us by history? Many, many people are not interested in Greater Romania. But even they, as does the whole world in fact, ironically watch our passive attitude toward accepting the division of the Romanians into two states.

We learn about the unification and especially about this strategy from the interview given by Mircea Druc to Vartan Arachelian. It is an exceptional interview broadcast by SOTI; it could not be broadcast on television channel I at a time when there is the largest audience, as someone would put it.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Druc believes that Romania is reunited. The situation is such that one cannot view it differently. "I am thinking and acting as if Romania was reunified," says Mircea Druc.

And he does not see (he does not want to see) what would hamper the Bessarabians in participating in sociopolitical activity in Romania. Thus, Mr. Druc is not concerned about the unification as such, but about technical difficulties. "It is one thing to declare the unification under the influence of external factors and the international political situation, and another thing to build the unification," he says. In this sense, Mircea Druc offers an exceptional plan for unification strategy.

—A treaty should urgently be concluded between Romania and Moldova whereby a common economic area is established.

—Naturally, this common economic area will also create a common social area.

—And a particularly important thing: The treaty should include a mutual assistance clause in case Romania or Moldova were threatened. It is impossible for Romania to be indifferent to an attack against Moldova. The same holds true for Moldova in case Romania were attacked. As far as the attitude of others toward this treaty is concerned, we do not have to give any explanations. Mr. Mircea Druc tells us: "For us it means one and the same country, while for others they are two fraternal countries. And this being so, brothers do not leave each other in the lurch."

—It is also very important that Bessarabians be able to participate in the parliamentary elections in Romania. Mircea Druc wants the Romanian Parliament to send a copy of the Electoral Law, so that people in Bessarabia know what to do.

"Thus a socioeconomic integration treaty, elections, and—very important in this economic treaty—a single currency monetary system—this is what we have to achieve now," Mr. Druc concluded.

We have to prove to the world that Romania's reunification is not a whim. It is the natural course of history. On the other hand, Mr. Druc affirms, if stability is desired at the gates to the Balkans, at the Black Sea and the Danube, then this can be achieved only through Romania's reunification.

Indeed, a Greater Romania—maybe the most natural state in the area—will act as a buffer against the agitation in the East and will bring balance to the Balkans.

This is Mr. Druc's strategy as far the unification is concerned. And we have to emphasize the extraordinary intelligence with which Mircea Druc acts—as a matter of fact, this unification strategy includes unification itself and imposes it both on ordinary and indecisive Romanians, and especially on the antiunification forces within the leadership of the two states.

And the disgraceful spectacle with the two hats comes to our mind. We ask ourselves—for the umpteenth time—whether the guy wearing the whitish fur hat and the one wearing the Russian fur hat—the “big” chiefs of state—are genuine Romanians.

“Konechno [Russian for of course], we are Romanians,” they would answer....

### Nicu Ceausescu To Receive Medical Treatment

AU0503205892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English  
1808 GMT 5 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 05/3/1992—Thursday, March 5, the Bucharest Military Court tackled the new request of convict Nicu Ceausescu, the youngest son of late dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, to have his sentence halted. Ten days ago, the Military Section of the Supreme Court of Justice pronounced a verdict to an appeal lodged by the accused, according to which no halting was admitted. In his new request, Nicu Ceausescu, sentenced to 16 years of prison, asks to be set free, as his diseases cannot be treated in penitentiary clinics.

The court agreed that a forensic report be made, in view of which Nicu Ceausescu will be transferred to a hospital of the Ministry of Health, to be established by the clinic of the penitentiary where the convict is hospitalized now.

### PHARE Projects Worth 130 Million ECU's

AU0503143892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English  
1332 GMT 5 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 5/3/1992—The Commission of European Communities earmarked to Romania this year 130 million ECU's out of the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] budget for the national programs, which is a 30 percent rise from the 1991 sums.

The indicative memorandum, negotiated last January with the scheduling mission of the PHARE Operational Service, stipulates the following destinations for these funds.

—Thirty million ECU's for privatization and industrial restructuring, of which 17.3 million ECU's for the National Agency for Privatization (enterprise appraisal, printing of ownership certificates, setting up and functioning of the ownership funds, antimonopoly policies, etc.), 9.3 million ECU's for the Ministry of Industry (sector surveys and surveys for the restructuring of the national corporations, cadres' and

managers' training, pilot projects, social costs of restructuring, etc.) and 2.5 million ECU's for the Romanian Agency for Development (promotion of investments).

—Ten million ECU's for small and medium businesses (credit facilities for private enterprises, training programs, etc.).

—Fifteen million ECU's for social protection and health.

—Thirty-two million ECU's for agriculture (wheat and potato import, development of private sector, setting up of a farm produce exchange, etc.).

—Five million ECU's for environment.

—Five million ECU's for finance and banking (restructuring and organization of the Central Bank, development of money market, stock exchange).

—Fourteen million ECU's for education and instruction.

—Nineteen million ECU's for the general technical assistance program.

The economic assistance given to Romania by the EC Commission and the member countries in the two years since the revolution is worth about 1.8 billion ECU's (over \$2 billion) representing about 45 percent of the Group-24 assistance program.

Of them, 800 million ECU's are included in the community programs for Romania, the remainder comes from bilateral [word indistinct], contingent upon the readiness of the elements of nomination, presentation and substantiation of the projects elaborated within the strategic sectors and objectives established under the agreements of financing, as well as of the speed of the selection procedures of the suppliers of goods and services.

### Living Conditions of Gypsies Described

92BA0587A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian  
20 Feb 92 p 9

[Article by Aasmund Willersrud: “Gypsies Detested”—first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] Even their pigeons are dirty and full of lice. Full of prejudice, a Romanian kid ducks his head to avoid the bird flying up from the stack of boxes outside the Gypsy family Vasile's shocking pink shack on the outskirts of Bucharest. The hard times have exacerbated antagonism in the Romany people's native country even more.

The old city parson, Nicolae Angelescu, in his long, black skirt comes shuffling on the narrow, icy street in between the small, gaudy Gypsy houses. He shakes his fist at the hooligans until he almost loses the bag of bread he has secured for himself. People in line outside the stall at the corner have been waiting for the bread truck for almost two hours already, but someone has taken pity on the old parson and given him a good loaf of homemade bread.

"Many of the Gypsies here are good men," he avers, "Orthodox Christians strong in their faith. They go to church every Sunday. But some of them are scoundrels," he sighs, "yes, rather uncivilized types."

Ioanna Vasile comes outside and greets the parson in a friendly manner. She lives in her little, pink house with her six children and 18 grandchildren and nephews, as she calls them. Tudor, the head of the family, died last year. The children now live as well as they can by carting empty bottles for cafes and stores. The widow's pension of 3,000 lei, or 60-70 Norwegian kroner, does not go very far when one kilogram of meat costs 1,000 lei. There is no real shortage of food in Romania, as in Russia, but far too little money to pay for it.

#### Wants To Leave

Her daughter Mariana, 22 years old with two children, just wishes to get away to find work. "All the young people want to leave. The dream is Germany or France," she says as she looks down the muddy path that is their street. "But it is impossible to find money for a ticket," she maintains. To buy a visa cannot even be thought of.

Hardly anyone knows for sure how many Gypsies there are in Romania today. The numbers in circulation range between 600,000 and 2.3 million. "There is much mixed blood and many of the Romany people are migrating," according to popular folk singer Ion Onoriu, who was elected president of the Gypsies last year. He heads the organization Uniunea Democrata a Romilor din Romania and will be working to secure rights for the Gypsies.

He proudly shows us a picture of himself with President Ion Iliescu. Onoriu requested the meeting to discuss the Gypsies' problems, and in particular he complained that the authorities halted the Gypsies' own hour-long TV program. Iliescu promised to look into the matter, but nothing has happened. One consideration is probably that Onoriu himself was the great star of the program, a fact the interpreter whispers through the corner of his mouth, but it was of fundamental importance for the people's cultural self-esteem.

"Even the Romanians loved the Gypsy program with all the popular music," the president maintained.

#### Chased Off

But no, life is not only song and music. The social problems of and the pressures against the Gypsy society have grown increasingly worse the last two years. Farmers have torched Gypsy camps and chased away the people in several villages. The worst incident happened in the Bolintin area west of Bucharest early last summer when Romanians burned down about 40 Gypsy houses. The killing of a Romanian youth triggered a mass reaction to chase out all the Gypsies from the district. Almost 2,000 villagers participated in a veritable street battle against hundreds of riot police who in vain tried to regain control.

Situations like that are arising repeatedly all over the country, according to Onoriu. Many Romanians regard the Romany people as a gang of thieves and scoundrels. "You must realize that there are great differences among the Gypsies in Romania. Those who live in camps, in tents, and in shacks make up less than one-fourth. But they are a very special group," he adds.

At the village of Jilava outside Bucharest we meet some from this group; of which some live in a tent camp and some in a group of small houses.

"Here there is no school, which is just as well as we would not want to go there," according to a young boy who thinks he is 14 years old. "It would not be allowed either," his friend declares, claiming never to have visited a public school during his 16 years of life. Have they thought of going abroad? "No, never. This is the life for us," the boys say.

#### The Stolen Bag

As we are leaving the place, our shoulderbag is missing. We request the return of at least our films; the bag and the old Russian fur hat do not matter much. We end up having to beat a quick retreat from a shower of stones and rusted tin cans hurled after us—by the mothers of the hopefuls.

We then ask the Gypsy president if his association does anything to improve the reputation of the Romany people. "We try very intensively to integrate them into society," he says and returns to the TV program which was important in that respect. He wants to found a special Gypsy theater. "Most of us live a very normal life," Onoriu assures us.

He is a highly cultured person and lives in a very elegant apartment centrally located across from the British Embassy. The organization he heads is first and foremost trying to help the Gypsies get their own land now that privatization of agriculture is in full swing. It is more difficult to furnish new jobs during these times of increasing unemployment in many sectors. When business is curtailed somewhere there is no doubt as to who is the first to be let go.

And there is a problem when the personnel manager of a company sees a Gypsy in the line of job seekers. Often they are thrown right out.

The opening of the border with Moldova might, strangely enough, offer new, interesting possibilities for the Romanian Gypsies. The Soviets gave the Gypsy community there the possibility of running privately owned artisan enterprises, and many of them became quite rich, according to Onoriu. Now they have plans for a cooperative project in Moldova.

All told there is a clear consciousness raising among the Gypsies in Romania as to their ethnic uniqueness. They secured their own representative as early as in the first

free parliamentary elections, independently of the rule that each ethnic group should have a set place. At the next election the goal is to mobilize a sufficient number

of Gypsies to obtain enough representatives that there will be a reasonable ratio in relation to their population. No matter how big this might be.

**Macedonian Muslims To Form Party**  
*92BA0539A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA*  
*in Macedonian 13 Feb 92 p 4*

[Report by P. Dzhambazoski: "Muslim Macedonians Will Form a Party"]

[Text] According to the Organization of Macedonian Muslims, the Macedonian Muslims have been left to fend for themselves and to fight alone against the chauvinist forces in the Balkans. Meanwhile, the Macedonian State and its policies are showing insufficient concern for the problems of Macedonian Muslims, it was stated at a press conference.

The republic association of cultural-scientific groups of Muslim Macedonians will most likely be converted to a political party very soon, so that it may function more efficiently among the Macedonian population of Muslim faith in the western part of Macedonia. Furthermore, a delegation of that organization will request a meeting with Kiro Gligorov, the president of the Republic, as soon as possible, as well as with the government in order to inform the Macedonian leadership of the increasing and no longer concealed attempts on the part of the Albanian Party, the Party for Democratic Action, and religious institutions and leaders to Albanize that same Macedonian population, with the eventual objective of creating a Greater Albania.

This was reported at yesterday's press conference of the Organization of Muslim Macedonians by its chairman, Lativ Pajkoski.

Pajkoski gave the journalists a number of examples of attempts to denationalize Muslim Macedonians, citing the Party of Democratic Prosperity [PDP], in particular, and the statement made by Nevzat Halili, chairman of the PDP, according to which that party will not allow the splitting of ethnic Albanian territories in Yugoslavia. Pajkoski, who criticized Macedonian science, which, in his view, supported a monistic policy, said that not a single book was allowed to be published about resettlement movements in Macedonia, to show that it was a question of 200 years of Albanian colonization of the western part of Macedonia. Actually, he said, there is not a single foot of ethnic Albanian territory in Macedonia. Because of the policy of silence, the Macedonians of both faiths are today abandoning these territories, which, in fact, is the objective of the Greater Albanian forces, said Pajkoski. The Macedonian Muslims are left to fend for themselves and to struggle alone against those forces, while the Macedonian State and its policy are showing a concern that, according to Pajkoski, is quite insufficient.

Pajkoski stressed that they are exposed to serious restrictions and threats on the part of the PDP, the NDP [National Democratic Party], the imported SDA [Party of Democratic Action], the Bosnian Muslim Party, and the Democratic Alliance of Turks, the purpose of which is to denationalize and assimilate the Muslim Macedonians, pointing out that the PDP, in order to take over

this Macedonian population, has claimed from its very founding to be a Muslim party, in the belief that it would thus be able to mislead that population and recruit it. Before the referendum on the so-called political and territorial autonomy of Albanians in Macedonia, the PDP was active among the Macedonian Muslims, Pajkoski said, citing as examples the events in Debarska Zhupa, where, in his view, the Islamic religious association in Debar was particularly active and even approved of the use of mosques as voting stations. After the failure of the PDP in the referendum, the Macedonian Muslims remained without protection and are being told that they should build churches because they have no business going into mosques, having failed to vote at the referendum, Pajkoski explained.

Dzhevat Gyulioski, the organization's secretary, pointed out that it is Sulejman Redzepi, chairman of the Islamic religious community in Macedonia, who particularly played the role of religious leader of all believers in Islam in Macedonia. His presence and statement at the recent PDP congress in Tetovo was of interest to the public, which questioned whether he should have been the religious representative of the PDP, inasmuch as the Muslim religion is shared by a large number of ethnic groups in Macedonia, Gyulioski said, and considering that Islam is not involved in party politics.

Asked whether the organization of Macedonian Muslims is prepared to handle all of the problems in the discussions with representatives of the PDP leadership, bearing in mind that, after the congress held by that party, the influence of democratically oriented individuals is obvious, Chairman Pajkoski answered in the affirmative, mentioning that the condition is that that organization must show respect; Gyulioski added that such preparedness does not date from yesterday but that the PDP leadership had been avoiding such discussions.

**New Law on Macedonian Military Analyzed**  
*92BA0540A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA*  
*in Macedonian 17 Feb 92 p 2*

[Report by Z.P.: "A Legalized Macedonian Military"—first paragraph is NOVA MAKEDONIJA introduction]

[Text] Political parties and associations may not be formed in the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia. In times of war, the police may also be used for combat assignments as a structural part of the armed forces. The length of military service will be nine months.

Considering the intensive withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army and the disarmament of the Republic, which significantly reduces its defense and combat readiness, the almost symbolic protection of the borders, and the overall political situation and ratio of forces in the former Yugoslavia, one of the priority laws, both in fact and procedurally, is the Law on the Defense of the Republic of Macedonia. It is in this situation, in fact, that the Republic has officially inaugurated its armed

forces and, with the unanimous passing of this law on Friday evening by the members of the Macedonian Assembly, has taken another major step in establishing its statehood. Actually, it is a question of a systematic step with which the ties, rights, and obligations of virtually all social subjects are established, and it is normal for this to be followed by legal acts and, in accordance with Article 128 of the Law on Defense, further regulations will be drafted within six months of the day of the enactment of the law.

The adoption of the Law on Defense establishes the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia. They will be equipped to wage armed struggle and to conduct other operations in case of war; the armed forces will also be organized to operate in peacetime, performing their constitutional function of defending the Republic. The armed forces will have an active and a reserve structure and will consist of various branches (ground forces, air force, and antiaircraft defense), arms, and services. The military obligations of the citizens will be universal: conscription, active-duty service, and service in the reserve forces. The citizens will be summoned by conscription commissions and registered, and then undergo physical and psychological tests. Citizens may be summoned at age 18 or, in exceptional cases, at age 17.

The duration of active-duty military service will be nine months (on exception, 14 months for individuals who, for reasons of religious conviction, do not wish to be issued weapons or to carry them) for individuals who have completed 19 years of age (or 21 if they have not completed their secondary school training); for university students, the deferment will be to age 26. Those who have served in the military and have completed their terms will transfer to the reserve, where they will remain until age 55. Women have not been spared, either, and

may serve in the reserve from age 19 to age 50. In other words, the standing armed forces will be composed of conscripts, career officers, and civilians working for the armed forces. The ranks, types of uniforms, and insignia of ranks, arms, services, and flags in the military will be set by the president of the Republic, who, in times of war, will have the right to extend the time of service in the reserve to age 60.

Political parties and associations may not be organized in the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia. The military command system is based on unified command, making use of the available forces and ordnance, standard subordination, and execution of lawful orders from superiors and regulations. The law also stipulates that, in times of war, the police may be assigned combat tasks as a structural part of the armed forces.

Soldiers from Macedonia who, for a variety of reasons, left the former Yugoslav People's Army will not have to do their military service in the Macedonian army but, when the law becomes effective, will become part of the reserve. Active-duty military personnel who have agreed to serve in the Macedonian army for a period of three months will continue their work in developing the system for the defense of the Republic. With the enactment of the law, the staffs and commands of the territorial defense will become part of the unified system for the defense of the Republic, and none of the federation laws pertaining to defense will apply any longer. The military courts will also be invalid, and, henceforth, their functions will be assumed by the regular courts and the public prosecutors. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that the real estate, equipment, inventory, and other ordnance used by Yugoslavia by the organization of the SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense], which are located in the territory of the Republic, are now Macedonian state property.

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SPRINGFIELD VA

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